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CHAPTER I 
Ur~:'RODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
The labor injunction at the present time is one of the 
centers of legislative attention in the Commonwealth of Massa-
c huset ts . Since this is the case the author feels that a re-
view of the history of the injunctive process in our state is a 
p roject which is both time ly and valuable . The labor injunct ion ! 
itself, t~~oughout l abor history, has been a much abused weapon 
in making l abor hew to the line prep ared for it by manage ment. 
Some of the key points in the use of the labor injunct ion are 
t he following: the relationship between picketing and free 
speech; the definition of labor dispute; the secondary boycott; 
1
the broad question of union security; and finally, the defini-
tion of property . The author proposes to explore the question 
lof the injunction under these headings and then to integr€l.te · 
them with the current proposals which incorporate t hese concepts ! 
i 
as a ma jor part of their being . Within this overall f ramev10rk II 
we will discuss the connnon law doctrines ; the legislative changes 
I 
which were attempted and accomplished; and finally, the inter-
I 
pretation of the various laws by t he courts of this commonwealth ~ 
I In this connection reference will be made to leading cases 
·which have been decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of l/[assa- I 
chusetts. I[ 
_I! 
The broad problem of the labor injunction is not 
pecul i ar to Massac husetts and for this reason we shall set 
hist.orical scene by tracing the injunctive process from the 
the I 
II 
English common law; its adoption to the field of labor relations I 
I land its wide use 
!Massachu setts. 
I 
in the United States after its first use in 
Our problem must be looked at as part of the overall I' 
problem of' labor relations in our economy. In modern industrial II 
society it is essential that a smoothly operating system of 11 
labor relations be achieved, in order that our economy may pro- 1 
I 
I 
gress. This problem broadly applies to all of our nation but 
lin Massachusetts we find a highly industl.,ialized society vvhich 
is very sensitive to any break in peaceful labor relations. The 
1 articular problem has be e n examined from the b road federal 
~ ictu re but novJ we wi ll attempt to examine it more closely at 
lt he s tate level. 
Given the greater problem of amicable labor relations, 
l1hat is t he place of the labor injunction? Does this weapon of 
lf quity add to our arsenal of peaceful means or does it tend to 
r estroy the whole pattern of peaceful labor relations? Is the 
~abor injunction a necessm.,y adjunct to our overall sch eme of 
~abor relations ? These questions will be discussed in this· studYill ' 
~nd use will be made of various situa tions in the history of or- I 
l~anized labor where they have played a major role. __ _j1 
2 
The injunctive process is an equitable process 
which comes to us from the early English common law. As a 
foun d a tion for our ll istorical approach we vdll establish cer-
tain definit ions and limitations. If we are to discuss an 
equitable process it is apparent t hr_t we must first determine 
what e quity means . 
Equi ty - in its broadest andmost gen-
eral signification denotes "the spirit 
~Dd the habit of fairness, justness, and 
right dealing which would regulate the 
intercourse of men with men •••• " •• But 
in this sense its obligation is ethical 
rather than j ural ••• In one of its tech-
nical meanings , equity is a body of jur-
isprudence, or field of jurisdiction, 
differing in its origin, theory and methods 
from the coHm.on law. 
FUrther it " ••• administers and adjusts 
common-law-rights ·where the courts of 
common-law have no machinery; ••• supplies 
a specific and preventive remedy for com-
mon-law wrongs where courts of' common lavv 
only give subsequent damages. 
Chute, Eq. 4. l 
Further, the equitable process was restricted by sev-
eral precepts or rules of procedure, that it might only do the 
justice fo r wh ich it aimed. 
The next definition which is necessary is that of 
injunction. This v'fe find defined as: 
I 
1Henry c. Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (West Publisfuing 
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota) 3rd Edit. Pp. 673-674. 
1\ 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
3 
A prohibitive 'ivri t i ssu ed by a court of 
equity,•at the s u it of a party complainant, 
directed to a party defendru1t in the action, 
or to a party made a defendant for that pur-
pose, forbidding the latter to do some act, 
or to permit his servan ts or agents to do 
some act , which he is threatening or attempt-
ing to cow~it , or restraining him in the con-
tinuance thereof, such act being unjust and 
inequitable , inj uriou s to the complainant, 
and not such as can ~e adequately redressed 
by an action at law. 
Within this broad definition we find three major sub-
I ypes of the injunction. The first of these is the temporary 
estraining order, or, 11 ex parte 11 injunction which is usually 
r rdered upon complaint and without hearing of the party com-
lained agai nst. The second is the temporary or interlocutory 
I ~ n junction ·which is issued upon heari ng but before final deter-
I 
ination of the case on the writs. The last t~YJ.Je is the final 
injunction which is granted when the rights of the parties are 
determined. 
From this equitable process vvhich v;e have defined 
springs the so-called labor i n juncti on. It is important to 
note t h3.t the fi rst two types of injunction are those generally 
found in labor disputes. The final injunction is seldom found 
in the labor field, as the dispute is usually settled i n the 
long time that elapses between the temporary restraining order 
and the full trial . 3 
2Henry c. Black, op cit, pp. 964-965 
3 Glenn Miller, American Labor and the Government, (Prentice-
Hall, I n c., New York, 1948. p. 108 . 
4 
I 
I 
I 
I, _ 
With this in mind let us investigate and determine 
the purpose of these two types of injunction in their be-
g inning . The purpose of the temporary restraining order or 
the i n terlocutory injunction is to maintain the "status quo " 
until the merits of the case are determined. 4 
A typical example of the proper use of this proces s 
wouldbe the following: Both A and B claim a piece of .prop-
' erty. B is i n t he process of cutting down trees from the 
property to the detriment of 11 if A' s claim is l egitimate . 
Since an action a t law in this case would .only b r ing subse-
quent damages and could not restore the property to its orig-
inal condition, A is entitled to seek i njunctive relief. This 
relief will maintain the property in its present condition m1d 
will not effect the rights of the parties. Now let us eval-
uate a situation in which the i njunction is applied to a labor 
dispute. Union A seeks certain items from its employer . They 
c bose their time carefully in order t hat tb.eir bargaining 
I 
strength, is at its peak, perhaps at the beight of the produc- I 
restrain t ive period. The e mp l oyer seeks and gains a temporary 
i ng order without the union being h e 8.rd. This prevent s the 
employee s from carrying out their strike at t h e most opp ortune 
time. Doe s this me asure up to the stru1dards of maintaining 
the status quo? Thus a t the outset ·we crul. see certain in-
4Henry C. Black, Q~ 0!-il"\t., 
equities creeping in when the i njunction is ap~lied to a 
labor dispute. 
Now that vre have determined certain definitions and 
certain limitations of equity and the injunction, l et us ~Ln-
vestigate the actual use of the labor injunction . As it grew 
ou.t of the English Conrrnon Lav1, we find its earliest applic a-
tion in England. The first use of the l8.bor injunct;ion v1as 
in the case of the Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley in 
the year 1868.5 This case involved an injunction granted to 
prevent publicity of a strike by the use of placards and 
advertisements. The comp any claimed that they were prevented 
f rom doing business and tbB.t the value of their property was 
thus seriously injured. This case was actually overruled and 
set aside in the c~se of Prudential Assurance Company v . 
Y~ott6 i n 1873. In this case Lord Chancellor Cairns ruled 
that, 11 the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to restrain 
the publication of a libel as such , even if it s hould be in-
jurious to property" . 
These two decisions are of more i mportance in the 
United States than in Eng land . The first case was used as 
the precedent fo r the issuance of labor injunctions in the 
Un ited States . Th is, i n spite of the fact that , prior to our 
5Law Reports 6, Equ ity 551 (1868) 
6Law Reports 10, Chapter 142. 
6 
r----
1 
I 
I 
i 
II 
I 
.I 
I 
II 
first case concerning t he labor injunction, the second c ase 
h ad been decj_ded~ I n having these cases in hand we ca..'Yl 
ser i-ously doubt the validity of English precedent as a reason 
for our ov1n labor injunctions. 
As a matter of record t he English courts did not 
foll mv the precedent of the Sprinp;head Case with t he single 
notable exception of the Taff Vale Railway Case which was de-
cided in 1901.7 However, the violent reaction of the public 
to this particular case led to the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 
which reduced to a minimum the actionable activity of labor. 
Th e act also had the e.ffect of setting aside the decision in 
the Taff Vale Case. 
In the United State s however, we find a rather dif-
I 7 
I 
ferent situation. With each step forward in labor organization 
v1e find a wider usage o:f the labor injunction. This is ex -
p licitly stated by some of our leading authorities i n the field 
of labor . "The courts of the United States have played an in-
cre asing role in t he government : injunctions, until ten or i'if-
teen ye?,rs ago , became more and more numerous, sweep i ng and 
restrictivt?. in labor disputes 11 • 9 These same authori t i es have 
applied the terminology 11 rule by injunction" to this sweeping 
· 
7The Taff Vale Railway Company, Appell, and the Ar11algamated 
Society of Railway Servants, Resp. L.R.A.C. (1901) 
86 Edward VII, Chapter 47, 1906. 
9Harry A 1'11t;l lis and Hoyal E. Montgomery , Organized Labor, 
(McGraw-Hill Book Company , Inc., N. Y., 1945) Vol. III, P . 630 
=J~L====~~========~8= 
use of the injunctive process. 
To be more specific in our historical tre-atment in 
the United States, we find the first use of the labor injunc-
tion at the state level (-Massachusetts) in 1888. The federal 
courts first used the labor injunction in the Northern Pacific J 
II 
caselO in 1893, but the important and widespread use of the rl 
Federal labor injunction began with the Pullman Strike of 1894 
and the subsequent case of Eugene V. Debs.ll From this point 
forward the federal labor injunction became increasingly im-
-r 
Gregory comments: / portant in limiting the activities of labor. 
But perhaps the most alarming feature 
of the labor injunction, ••••• was the 
ease with which its use increasingly 
tempted judges to dispense with any 
well-founded independent theory of 
illegality. -:H~It seemed to lead many 
courts to grant sweeping injunctions 
on the basis of personal or class dis-
like of labor's economic program in-
stead of in accordance with settled 
standards of law ••••• l2 
I 
II 
I 
I 
The question may be asked, what if the federal courts ! 
did use the injunction, why should this effect Massachusetts? 
Investig ation shows that the federal policy in many cases is a 
determining factor in the formation of state policy on a given 
subject. Although this is true it does not mean that the var-
ious states have limited themselves to mere copies of the fed-
10Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company , 60 Federal 803 (1894) . 
llunited States v. Debs, 64 Federal 724. 
12charles 0 .. Gregory, Labor and the Law, (W.W.Norton Company , 
New York) p. 102. 
9 
+=--
eral laws or policies. In some cases they have adopted 
broader laws and others more narrow and restrictive laws.l3 
Massachusetts led the vYay in the use of' the inju...n.c -
tion, set t ing t he pre ce dents and a l so using the labor i njunc -
ti on to control the activities of its rapidly growing indus-
trial population. Since t hese early days Massachusetts has 
adopted many items of' progressive legislation but has railed 
to outlaw the use of the inj unc t ion in labor disputes. Sev-
eral attempts were made, one as early as 1914, but due to the 
mes_ns by which it attempted to outlaw the labor injunction , 
it was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial 
I 
Court . In some respects Massachusetts has been a leader , but I 
as we shall see this was not the case in curbing the widesprea~ 
use of the labor injunction. 1 
13Charles c. Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts, (Univ-
ersity of Chicago Press, 1948 ) p. 4 . 
CHAPTER II 
!USE 
I 
OF LABOR INJUNC TIONS IN 'I'IIE UJHTED STATES AND Iv!ASSACHUSETTS 
I 
I 
BEFORE 1932. 
This chapter as its title i ndicates will deal with the 
ruse and development of the labor injunction in the United States 
and in Massachusetts before 1932 . Actually since the use of the 
injunction on the American labor scene starts in Massachusetts 
~ve will deal vvi th the state first and then proceed to the wide-
spread use in the federal sphere . One item is required by way 
of background here , The labor injunction was not the first meanJI 
rused to curtail labor activity in the United States. The first I 
~ethod wa s the doctrine of criminal c on s p iracy which again was 
1 adapted from the English co:m:rnon law. The most i mportant feature 
11 of this doctrine is t h e fact that it served to we ight the minds ~f the j u rists against any combined activ ity of workmen. The 
bub of the doctrine is found in an early English case where a 
~onspiracy of any kind is said to be , " •• • illegal although the ; 
raatter about which they conspired might have been lawful for I 
fthem , or any of them to do i f they had not conspired to do it. ul II 
It is under this doctrine that we have our first ma jor labor 
pase i n Massachusetts __ being tT·ied. 
1Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge , 8 Mod 10, ( 1721 ). Re-
print_ed in part in Glenn Miller, op cit , p. 50 . 
In the development of this chapter we will point 
out the law and its application in the courts and also add 
some com.m.ent by experts v1fho have analyzed the problems which 
vYe are tracing . The use of federal law and cases is necessi-
tated by the fact that although Massachusetts was first to use 
the l abor injunction the lead was taken over by the federal I 
cpurts and legislature. 
Pe·rhaps the best starting point for oul"' analysis is 
the turning point of labor law v1herein the criminal conspiracy 
doctrine was overthrown i n Massachusetts , and the end of the 
doctvi ne throughout the country was foreshadowed. This came 
about with the now famous case of Commonwealth v. Hunt i n the 
year 1842. 2 I n this case we find several very i mp ortant 
c _kanges in regard to conspiracy and the foundatlon for f reer 
acti-vity on the part of labor. The case was decided in a 
period \"/herein labor was being buffeted about by the courts 
which leaned strongly to the side of the employers . The case 
involved a strike by a gl''OUp of men against their employer to 
attain a closed shop.. Thus the charge was one of conspiracy 
I because of the concerted action of the group against their tl 
the !I employer . Chief Justice Shaw in examining the case became 
first American jurist to dist i nguish betvveen the means and the 
end. Was a com"J?ination of itself an unlawful action if under- 1 
2 4 Mete 111 
I 
11 
taken for a laudable end? Shaw thought not. Although this 
1Has a long step forward by the Chief Justice himself it did 
not aut oma t ically become the opinion of either other state 
cour ts or even become a settled policy in Massachusetts. At 
least it became a point to be thought o:f in con:.r1.ection with 
any decision on a so-called conspiracy case involving labor . 
As a r esult we find that the criminal conspiracy doctl'"'ine 
slovrly deteriorated. By the 1880's we reach the end of any 
widespre ad prosecution under criminal conspiracy. 
Does this change indicate that the courts were now 
more f avorable to the organization of labor? No, it simply 
indicates a change in the method of attack upon labor organ-
i zations. Professor Wit t e st a tes tha t the change occurred 
r:solely because injunction became the usual form of a c t ion in 
legal controversies arising out of labor disputes 11 . >3 Thus 
we arl"i ve at the in j unction as a means of cux•tailing the or-
ganized activities o:f labor. 
Massachusetts had been early an industri alized state 
and for that reason had taken certain steps to protect em-
ployers by assuring them of a source of l abor supply which 
would be protected from interference . I n order to implement 
this policy a statute had been passed in 1875 which dealt with 
3 Harry A. I\lellis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor, 
(McGraw- Hi ll Book Company , Inc., N.Y., 1945) 
II 
II 
1\ 
II 
12 
I 
I 
ll 
r: subject. The statute follows: 
I 
I 
li 
I 
Section 19. Interfering with Employment 
Forbidden. - No person , shall, by intimi-
dation or force, prevent or seek to pre-
vent a person from entering into or con-
tinuing in the emp l oyment of any person. 
(1875 , 211, Sec. 2 ; P.~. 74, Sec . 2 ; 1894 , 
508, Sec. 2, R.L . 106, Sec. 11 ; 1 909 , 514, 
.ss 18, 145.)4 
Under this statute was issued the first labor injunction in 
the United States, in the case of She,..·ry v. Perkins. 5 The 
case involved a labor dispute in which the workmen patrolled 
or picketed the employer bearing banners vvhich requested other 
vvorkmen not to seek employment . Mr. Sherry sought a temporary 
restraining order, which was granted , forbidding the employees ! 
to so picket and announce their labor dispute to their fellow I 
workmen. The who le decision on appeal was based upon the fol.::. 
lowing interpretation interpretation ·or the words of the sta-
tute: 
11 
•••• It is not found t hat the inscription 
on the banners were false , nor do they ap -
pear to have been in disparagement of the 
plaintiff ' s b~siness. The scheme in pur-
suance of which the banners v1ere displayed 
and maintained , was to injure the plain-
tiff's business , not by defaming it to the 
public but by intimidating workmen , so as 
to deter them from keep ing or making en-
gagements with the plaintiff •••• "6 
With the decision in this case a precedent was established 
which was not only used in the Massachusetts courts but also 
4Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 149, Tercentary Edition 
5147 M~ssachusetts 212 , 17 N. E. 207, 6 A.L.R. 924 . 
6Ibid 
~~ 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I r) 
14 
I (. 
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I in the federal courts in the case of Gompers v. Buck Stove 1 
I
ll and Range Coii1Pany. 7 Thus we find this early Massachusetts I 
case to be of much more than passing importance both in the 
I 
II 
I· II 
il 
I 
I 
II 
I 
i 
I 
i 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
narrow local s phere and also at the federal level. 
Whi le this broader use of the labor i njunction was 
being amplified in the federal courts, Massachusetts had its 
second major case involving the labor injunction. In 1896 
Justice Allen, who had rendered the decision in the Sherry 
Perkins case was called upon to render another decision in-
volving picketing in a labor dispute. In this case Mr. Jus-
tice Allen further interpreted the language of that section 
of the law dealing vii th interference with employment . In 
part he states : 
" ••• • Intimidation is not limited to 
threats of violence or of physical 
in j ury to person or property. It 
has a broader signification, and 
there may als o be moral intimidation 
which is i l legal. Patrolling or pick-
eting under the circumstances stated 
in the report has elements of intimi-
d ation similar to those found in Sherry 
v . Perkins 147 Massachusetts 212 , 17 
N. E. 307 . "8 
That this interpretation was not an entirely satisfactory one 
is testified to by the dissents entered by both Chief Justice 
Field and Justice Holmes. Chief Justi ce Field said in part , 
7 ,'J.Jl I ! • .'I s v .J 1;.. ., . _; ' .. 
221 U. S . 418 (L911 ) 
I 
IJ 
'I 
I 
8 Vegelahn v . Guntner, 167 Mass 92, 98 44 N. E. 1077 , 35 L. R. A. · 
1077 (1896) 
r 
I' 
II 
15 
II 
r===== 
II "to persuade one man not to enter into the employment of 
another, by telling the truth to him about another such per-
son or his business, I run not c onvinced is actionable at com-
1 h t t , t . b 11 9 mon aw w a ever ne mo J.ve may e •••• Thus did thi s emin-
ent jurist indicate that in his op inion the law was being 
stretched beyond a reasonable limit by the court . In these 
early instances in Massachusetts we find the beginning of a 
long era of legislation by the courts . This usurpation of 
I 
I 
II 
the legislative power though it may not have been intentional / 
is very definitely a factor in the difficulties with which 
labor was faced . Of course, the ultimate fault lies with the 
legislat ive branch which fails to clarify the law t hat there 
may b e no doubt as t o its i ntent . 
The very interpretation fo und by Justice Allen is 
questioned by Justice Holmes. This dissent is al l the more 
stri k ing when one considers the fact that Mr . Holmes as a 
usual practice did not write a separate dissenting opinion. 
In part he states i n his dissent: 
" •. • Furthermore , it cannot be said , 
I think , that tvvo men, ·walking to-
gether up and down a s i dewalk , a..nd 
speaking to those who enter i nto a 
certain shop, do necessari l y and al-
ways thereby convey a threat of force . 
I do not think it p ossible to di scri rr.-
inate, and to say that two workmen or : 
even tvvo members of' an organization of 
..,-----------.. - --
9Ibid I 
II 
=====lr--
1 
I 
workmen do; especially when they are, 
and are known to be, under the injunf-
tion of this court not to do so •••• " 0 
Thus v;e find in 1896 that the tenor of some of the great 
judicia l minds is toward more freedom of labor to orga..nize 
and to advertise its condition. The more liberal minded 
-· jurists take the stand for more freedom of speech for workmen' 
organization. The right to strike, which had been established 
i n the case of Commonwealth v . Hunt , means little, if the 
means of carrying out a successful strike are denied to the 
workers . Thi s is the case when they a re prohibited from an-
nouncing or advertising their labor difficulty by picl{eting. 
Up to this point the Massachusetts courts have 
chosen to look upon picketing as an unlawful means to attain 
any objective for a labor organization. With the case of 
Plant v. Woodsll in 1900 we find a new approach to the subject 
This case arose out of a boycott and strike by unionized em-
ployees because the e mployer refus ed to discharge members of 
another union. An injunction was sought and granted to the 
employer restraining picketing by those who had struck. On 
appeal the Supreme Judicia l Court upheld the - injunction on the 
grounds that, since the striking employee s v1ere seeking a 
closed shop, the strike and picketing vvas for an unlawful ob-
10Ibid 
11176 Mass 942, 57 N. E. lOll . 
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==============_II ===I r jective. Again Mr .. Justice Holmes .felt that he vv-as .forced to 
di ssent. Holmes held tha t this vvas a law.ful comb i nation a.nd 
sought a legitimate end. The ma j ol''i ty however c ould not or 
would not recognize the r i ght of' a union to strengthen its 
organization or seek j ob control . 
I n his dissent Mr. Justice Holmes presents a strong 
r u le of' law, that is, justification. It is his opinion that 
unless the challenged conduct is justified then it is defin-
itely actionable. Howe ver , his colleagues f ai l to dist i nguish 
between the two situations; one where justification ex ist s 
and the second , where it does not. This is an extension of' 
comment that Mr. Jus t ice Holmes draws from the early decision 
of Commonweal th v. Hunt . Here Shaw has pointed out that if a 
man should set up a con1peti tive business in a small tovn-1. un-
doubtedly a part of his acti on would be to destroy any preex-
isting business of the s ame nature in the tovm. Yet such con-
dl:tct is not held to be unlawful. I t ·would seem that from a 
legal standpoint ther e is no quest ion but that activity vvhich 
is undertaken to strengthen a union for future bargaining is 
a ·worthy and justifiable end~ 
I n later dec isions this case also served as precedent 
f or deterrnining the legali ty of certain strikes . It is upon 
this j udici a l opinion and its corollaries that Mr . Frankf'urter I 
b a ses the f ollowing: 
11 
Courts find the "key" to the justi-
ficati.on of challenged conduct in 
labor cases in the purpose of the 
injury and the means by which it is 
inflicted. But, like the 11 key 11 to a 
city, it unlocks nothing. 
When the objectives of concerted 
action are higher wages, shorter hours 
and impr oved working conditions , all 
measures in themselves not tortious 
may be employed. Here the benefit to 
workers is direct and obvious and the rigb. 
right to combine for such purposes is 
universally recognized . But when em-
ployees aim at a purpose 11 one degree 
more remote, namely to s trengthen t heir 
union as a preliminary and means to en-
able it to make a better fight on ques -
tions of wages or other matters of clash-
ing interests 11 , courts vary in their 
approach to the problem with resulting 
conflict in the decisions . l2 
This statement describes very adequately the s i tuation in 
Massachusetts. The situation is a stra...nge one when vfe con-
sider that it was in this sarne state and court that Chief 
Justice Shaw had made the celebrated decision regarding the 
legality of organization for the closed shop . It seems that 
as time passes tb.e later courts are wil l ing to accept some 
parts of the decision but r e .j ect others. From Connnonv1eal th 
v . Hunt they accept the right to strike but limi t it by not 
accepting the fullness of Shaw's decision which binds in the 
legality of a strike for a closed shbp. 
Thus at the turn of the cent'ln~y vve find that the 
u..n.ions are very adequately kept vvi thin bounds by the applica-
12Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene , The Labor Injunction, 
(Macl"lillan Company , New York ) 1930 , p . 26. 
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j ust. At this time we find the American economy growing by 
leaps and bounds. The corp orate form is the usual one and 
therefore the old type of personal el!I1; loyer-employee relation- I 
ship has almost disappeared . The legal restl'ictions of busi- !1 
ness have been applied , and with great effect, to the labor 
li 
organizations of the period ~ 
A series of Massachusetts cases in the early 1900's 
follows the pattern, established in the past , that the closed 
shop is an illegal end, and as such, any activity undertaken 
to further it is also illegal. But at the same time we find 
some ratber strange contJ'adictions cropp ing up as a result of 
j u dicial legislation. In the case of Plant v . Woods it had 
been laid down that a strike and boycott arising out of a 
dispute between two labor unions as to which should represent 
the workers , or rather, which should be recognized as 'the 
I 
Il
l 
arises to upset this decision and to condone one of the worst 
I 
union' was illegal . Then the case of Pickett v. Walshl3 
types of coercive techniques , the jurisdictional dispute. In 
this case the problem arose over the fact that certain workers, 
' I I 
called pointers , were employed to perform the work of pointing '/ 
brickwork and masonry . The bricklayers and masons made it 
clear the.t if the practice ·was continued they would withdraw 
13 
192 Massachusetts 572 
I 
I 
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11 their services. Since the pointers could not do the work of 
I[ the bricklayers the employer complied. At the same time the I 
~~~ union of bricklayers and masons refused to accept the pointers 1
1
' 
11 
i nto their organization. The difference found by t h e court 
1 
lr was one of competition. Thus the court on the one hand f inds I ~~ :::;:::~~n v::Y e::::l ::e::r:h:: ::r:h:.,: t:::u::n:f i: o:::: ~~~~ 
II II v. Woods where two competing groups of the same trade are in I 
Ill competition, the court refuses to accept it. It seems that ~~ the further into labor law the court moved the more confused II 
I it became. In recognizing strikes which were for higher wages 11 
I it held its head high and speaks of the union using their eco- 11 
II nomic power for their economi c advantage. At the same time j 
li the court absolutely refuses to allow a strike for the closed rl 
I shop, whi ch is the means of building the economic power of' the 1l 
[ organization for l ater exercise. I 
I Again in 1908 we have reiterated the doctrine tP-!!t ~~~ 
the closed shop strike is illegal. This was in the case of 
1 Reynolds v. Davis. 14 In the same year we have a slight change 1
1 of heart on the part of the court in the case of Willcut v. I' 
Drisco11. 15 In this case the Bricklayers and Stonemas ons 
Union had presented demsnds for increased wages, payment of 
wage during working hours and other points. To insure success 
14
198 Mass 294 
15200 Mass 110 
20 
when a strike was called, the union threatened by fines and 
penalties any member who might continue to vvork. Against this 
the contracting company sought a bill in equity. The court 
held that though these were unlawful means and should be en-
joined the objectives mi ght not be unlav1ful. The court con-
sidered the strike as one simp l y for the purp ose of attaining 
higher \•rages and a shorter day. 
The year 1911 brings several more cases to reiterate 
some of the old established doctrines of the Massachusetts 
courts and to add some nev1 matter. In Folsom v. Lewis l6 we 
find restated the old proposition tha t the closed shop strike 
is unlawful. Chief Justice Knowlton states in part in his 
decision: 
" ••• conduct directly affecting a..n em-
p loyer to his detriment, by interference 
with his business, is not justifiable 
in law , unless it is of a k ind a.nd for 
a purpose that has a direct relation 
to benefits that the laborers are try-
ing to obtain. Strengthening the forces 
of a labor union, to put it in better 
condition to enforce its claims in con-
troversies that may afterwards arise 
with employers, is not enough to j us -
tify an attack on the business of an 
employer by inducing his employees to 
strike."l7 
He re again we find the direct action idea stated. This is 
also shown by the case of Minasian v. Osborne l8 wherein a 
16208 IIass 336 
17rbid 
18210 Mass 250 
21 
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li 
strike for wages, hours and working conditions was upheld . 
Something new is added by the DeMinico v. Craigl9 decision of 
the sarne year in which it is held that if the purpose of a 
strike is primarily to injure the employer the strike is il-
legal . Further to make the str•ike lawful it is necessary that I 
the purpose of the strike be one that the courts as a matter I 
I 
I 
of law decides is a legal purpose and also that the strikers 1 
must act in good faith f or such purpose. Notice however that I 
'I 
the good faith of the stril{ers alone does not alter the legal- ~ 
i ty of the strike. The court vlill decide the legality of tb.e 
purpose aside from their g ood faith. This same attitude con-
ti:nues and is reiterated in case after case. Labor's hands 
are tied by legal means, legal purpose s, go od faith and other 
such legal _double talk. The who le doctrine of illegal ends 
and means which was adopted f rom the collli11on law of England in 
a period when English l .aw was unsettled has proven to be a 
failure at least in our Massachusett s courts . Consider the 
doctrine whi ch started this whole era 'of common law . That 
which one alone may do is illegal when two or more join to 
Consioer 
accomplish it. /:this doctr5.ne iri face of the mounting size 
the industri a l firm. The laborer must beat alone with his 
hands on the rock of big business;. Even when this doctrine 
modified and collective action vms permitted we find mixe d in 
with t h e permission the seeds of disorganization. You may 
join in a union to accomplish your e nds, but those particular 
19207 Mass 593 
22 
_l 
aspec t s of collective action '\!•rhich vlill malre y ou s t rong l 
enough to at tai n your le g i timat e ends are forbidden to you. 
Thi s sort of c ontradiction was suffi c i e n t to arous e 
the p ublic a n d t h e l egislature to t ake action in a n at tempt 
to fre e labor fr om some of the b onds which h ad be e n i mp osed 
I 
I 
I in the past. I n t he years 1913 and 1914 t wo piece s of l egis- ,. 
lation 1uere passed whi c h indicated the t r e nd. The fi rst of I 
t he se was t h e Peac e ful Persu a sion Act of 1913. 20 Let us l ook I 
at the words of t h e act and t h en examine t h e spiri t of t he lawJ 
Section 24. Peace f u l Pe rsuas ion Not 
Penalized. No person shall be punished 
criminally , or held liable or answerable 
in any action at law or suit in equ ity, 
for persuading or attempt i ng to persuade, 
by printing or otherwise , any other per-
son to do anything , or to pursue any line 
of conduct not unl awful or actionable or 
in violat ion of any mart i al or other legal 
duty, unl ess such persuasion or• attempt to 
per•suade is ac c omp a.n ied by injury or threat 
of i n j ury to the pers on, property, business 
or occupat ion of the person persuaded or 
attern.pted to be pe rsu aded, or by disorder 
or other unlawful conduct on the part of 
the person p ersu ading or atte mp ting to per-
suade , or is a part of an un lawful or ac -
tionable conspiracy.21 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
At first glance it would a ppear that this law · t I pernu s 1 
a decided freedom of action on t h e part of labor in picketi ng 
) 
and othel"Wise publici z ing a labor dispute . However , the v1ord-
20G. L. C.l49 S.24 
21Ibid 
I 
T 
I 
24 
ing of the act is s1..1.ch as to penni t considerable latitude to 
the courts in determining whether Ol""' not a particular a ction 
is permissible. The phrase " • •• unless such persuasion or at-
tempt to pei'suade is accomp anied by injury •• • rt is all that is 
neces s ary to l imit the right to peacefully persuade. Another 
f actor which is not considered in the act is the question of 
whether or not such injui'Y i s j ust i fiable . The whole prin-
cip le of tort law and, by adoption , of equ ity is that certain 
actions are unlawful unless justified. This statute does not 
provi de any statement as to such possible j ustification and 
tb.us courts may choose to ignore such·princ i ple . 
A second feature of this act which the courts chose 
to interpret to the detriment of labor is in regard to what 
constitutes an unlawf'ul Ol"' actionable conspir~cy . It i s ac -
cepted by all that a strike to secure higher wages , better 
I 
II 
I! 
II 
II 
I 
I 
hours or working conditions is not unlawful or actionable . I n 1 
I 
addition , even in Massachusetts , it w~s held that a strike to ~~ 
,I 
I 
to work with non-
Yet I 
I 
secure for union members the exc l us i ve right to d o work :fal l-
ing vvi thin a cel"tain fie l d of l abor is legal. 22 Finally a 
strike to unionize a business, by refus i ng 
union employees, has been upheld in this commonwealth.23 
as time passed the courts c hoose to i gnore these precedent s 
I
I 
I 
22Picket v . Walsh , 192 Mas s 572 
j 
11
/ 
23
com...rnonv1ealth v . Hunt , 45 Mass 111 , Bovven v . Matheson 96 
.. Mass 499 . 
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and f i nd simi lar activitie s unl awful . By find i ng these ends 
I 
I 
,, 
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unlawful the means of attaining these ends automatically be- I 
come unl av.rful and even peaceful persuasion becomes enjoinable. 
Thus we find that this first piece of progressive 
legislation , a l thoug h it remained on the books, failed in its I 
purp ose of adding to labor ' s right to bargain collective ly and ! 
persuade p eacefully. This is obvious when you review and find ! 
tha t after the passage of this act all those t h ings r1hich had I 
been al lowable in the past were still so, and no new freedom / 
had been added . For practical purposes it vms merely a lis tin~ 
of the old rights to pursue a purely economic objective, such I 
as wages , hours or working conditions by means of peaceful I 
I 
persuasion; but when any such question as union security arose I 
or when organizational strikes occurred labor ·was still for-
bidden the right to peacefully persuade others to j oin them. I 
These facts wi ll be even more clear when the curr·ent proposals 
1
1 
I for c b.ange in our labor laws are discussed. 
The second statute which was passed at this time was 
I the Massachusetts Anti-In j unction Act .24 rrhis law sought to 
I 
remove labor relations from the scope of equity p r ocedure . I 
The first section of the act specifically states that it shall / 
not be unlawful for any person , employed or not, to enter into 
any t;Jpe of agreement or combinat i on .for the purpose 
ing hours , i ncreasing wages or bettering conditions; 
24 Chapter 778, Acts and Resolves 1914 . 
of lessen~ 
and that 
11 
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no injunction shall issue in ru1.y case betvv-een, 11 employer and 
emp loyee •.•• or betwee n persons emp loyed and persons seeldng 
emplo~nnent 11 ••• , except where irreparable damage will e nsue and 1 
where the remedy at law is inadwquate. The second section 
1!1 
re a lly makes the revolutionary change in the law . I n this sec- ! 
I 
tion the right to work and the right to carry on business are I 
designated as personal r i ghts and not as property rights. By 
this definition the parties are barred from equitable relief' 
It is a Jl 
well established principle of equ ity that it will not intervene ! 
~Dd are limited strictly to their remedies at law. 
to protect a mere personal right by injunction. The final sec-
1
1 
tion of the act merely notes that no concerted action by labor I 
in the way of combination, or any act done in pursuance of thei~ 
·I 
objectives as stated shall be an indictable of'fense, unless i 
such action is of itself unlawful . 
I 
This law, wbich would have removed labor from the 
shadow of the injunction, was a short lived one but ag~in it 
fairly ·well represented the attitude of the public as reflected! 
1 . 1 t It ~ b . t 1 . II in the e gls a ure. seems o VlOUS tha peop e were concerne9. 
with the problem faced by labor in our Commonwealth and were j 
In 1916 in the case of' i doing their best to lighten the burden. 
Bogni v. Perotti25 this statute was declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Judicial Court of' Mas sachusetts . It was he ld 
1 that the right to labor and to do business were con stitution-
~F=2=5=2=2=4==Th=1a=s=s==l=5=2================================================~F=~-~~=-----
could not be ~y guaranteed property righ ts and that t hey 
1 
altered by a mere legis l at ive action denoting t h em as somethin 
1 
else. Thus again we find that labor is stripped of its pro- i 
I 
tection against the injunction. The purpose of the legislatur,[ 
was not questioned in the case in which this act 1vas overthrown!. 
It is the method alone which vms declared unconstitutional. 
The situation was no better in our own Cormnomveal th 
than at the federal level for the period through the early 
1930's. The same precedents are found cited in numerous cases 
such as Corne iller v. Haverhill Shoe Association26 and more 
particularly in 1921 i n United Shoe Machinery Company v. Fitz-
gerald.27 This case involved a replacement of i ndividual con-
tracts by a collective agre ement. Today there would be little 
question on that scox•e, but the union in the case was en joined 
because such an end was held to be illegal. Again in 1922 a 
II 
I 
case arose wherein a union sought reinstatement of its members j 
and recognition of the union. As a threat to the employer the II 
union said it would seek a id from the central labor union. Be l l 
:Lore such action was taken the employer sought and received an j 
injunction against t his anticipated violation of their right 
to do business . 28 
Under the heading of interference with occupation 1Ne 
I 
I 
• 
I 
28 
Mass 554, 560 
Mass 537 
28Hote l & Railroad News v. Leventhal 243 Mass 317 =~= 
I[ 
r 
I
I 29 
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II f'in d some statements of law in the Massachusetts digest. It is I 
I I 
I held that an employee ' s right s to l abor are entitled to pro·tec- 11 
tion against wanton interference, but t he rights are not so 1 
valuable as valid contracts for con tinued sei•vice for a defini t I 
I I 
i period. Here is the statement of law. What are the f act s? I 
1
[ Professor Witte points out that a lthough our Supreme Court has I 
i II 
I
I recognized the right of a union to strike i n order to enforce I 
the discharge of a man against Yihom there is a legitimate griev 11 
1
1 
ance , there is not a single case where this court has found a JJ 
I 
I 
,, strL:e for the discharge of non unionists j ust ifiable . 29 Strik 1 s 
II as in the Leventhal case above have been banned and while stri) s 
I 
II 
II 
I 
to procu:r.•e the discharge of a rival unionist have not been held 
u n lawful the courts Ymve refused to allow the motive of strengt _  
'i 
ening a union to serve as justification. Wl1.en t h e closed shop 
agreemen t is freely entered i nto it seems to fall under the 
scope of a valid contract and thus shou ld be a b asis for dis- I 
I 
charge or reinstatement of workers under the law as cited above 
1
1 
Note here that such a II 
The same general ~~~~ 
d i sposit ion of the courts continued through the early 1930's 
but the c a ses are to the contrary. 30 
closed shop agreement is held to be valicl.31 
and little was attempted by the legislature. A significant ex- 1 
ception was the attempt to l egalize the closed shop which was 1 
i 
1 
29Quoted in Millis and Montgome1~y, op cit, p. 561 
1
1 
I
I 30P1ant v. Woods 176 Mass 492, Berry v. Donovan 188 Mass 353 , 1 
Picket v . Vialsh 192 Mass 572, Stearns Lt.lmber Company v . How·- l 
lett 260 Mass 45 ( 1927). For othel~s see Millis & Montgomery , 1 
in Labor Disputes. ·T
11 
I 31Hoban v. Demp sey 217 Mass 166. 
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I 
defeated in 1929. 
The broader use of the injunctive process in the fed-
eral courts cs.me about with the applicB_tion of the anti-trl.l_st 
lav1s and restrs.int of trade doc trine to labor orc;anization. 
Thus with the Debs case32 arising 01.1.r of the Pullman Strike of 
1894 ·we have a whole new avenue in the law by vvhich labor or-
ganizations could be chastised. The Debs Case grev'l out of the 
I 
! 30 
I 
i n junction whiclJ. the fedePal government sought in order to pre-
vent interference with the mails and interstate com.merce. The I 
injunction itself was one of the most sweeping on record. 33 j 
It restrained Debs, the officers of the American Railvray Union I 
and 11 all other uersons whomsoever 11 from: 
... 
(1) in any way or manner interfering with, 
hindel'"'ing, obstructing, or stoppi ng the 
trains entering Chicago carrying mails or 
interstate commerce; (2) 11 compelling or 
inducing or attempting to con~el or induce, 
by threats , intimidation, persuasion , fol''Ce, 
or violence 11 any railway employees not to 
perform tb.eir duties, or nto leave the ser-
vice of the railroads; (3) doing any act •• 
in. furtherance of any conspix•acy or .£.2.!g-
bination to restrain ••• railway companies 
in the free •••• control and handling of 
i:ry.ters~ate c:n11.1:erce; a:ry.d ~4) 11 ord:ri~~' 
dlrectlng , aldlng , asslstlng or aoet~lng 
in any manner whatsoever any person or '""' 
persons to comJni t any •.•.• of these acts . uo4 
The ultimate decision i n the case of In re Debs did 
not pass upon the applicability of the Sherman .Act to labor 
32un:tted States v. Debs, 64 Federal 724 
33E. Berman , Labor and the Sherrnan Act, (Harper and Bros. , 
1930, New York) p. 65. Reprinted Miller, op cit, p. 124. 
~ Ibid l·-
1 
I, 
dispute s but it strongly uphe ld t h e use of tb.e injunction in 
a strike. Sin ce we are ultimately con c erne d with this aspect 
of the case the decision is extreme ly meaningful. Th e broe.d 
sweep of the injunction issued in the case served as a model 
for t bat type of labor injunction better known as the blanket 
injunction . This type of injun ction vii t h out d oubt , due to its 
swe ep i ng character , impinged upon the constitutiona l privi-
leges of those enjoined. 
At the federal level the labor injun ction was not 
again made a Supr·eme Court is sue unt i l 1911 . However, l abor 
had b een definitely placed un der the ban of the She r man Act , 
which had not been done in the Debs Case . This si tus.tion 
aros e in t h e case of Loewe v . Lawlor35, more popularly known 
as the 11 Danbury Hatters Case". Also i n this case the second- , 
ary boycott, insofar as it inte rfered with intersta te commerc e ! 
was declared illegal . I 
These new restrictions fov.nd in the federa l courts 
lead us to more agitation by labor for freedom to bargain and 
to organize . The strong l egal restrictions of the injunction I 
as e_pp lied to labor is being pointed up as an ins i dious cancer ~ 
whi ch is gnavling avvay at the vitals of organized labor. As a I 
result of this we find a movement to remove labor from the 
scope of the tru st laws . This attempt ·was made in the federal 
35208 u. s. 274 (1908 ) 
31 
I 
I 
I 
rl 
I 
I 
code by tb.e Clayton Act of 1914.36 This act, once hai led by 
l abor leaders as labor 1 s Magna Charta, vras soon found to be 
something le ss . In this corLnection Professor Berman states 
that the Act, especially section 16, which permits private in-
'I 
li 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
'I I, 
ill 
junct i on suits under anti-trust laws, is one of' the most im- 11 
portant reasons for the increased use of the Sherman Lavi agains[~ 
I, 
(Prior to 1930.) Of 39 private injunc~ 1 labor in recent years. 
tion suits brought a gainst labor, 34 were brought after passage 
of the Clayton Act. Perhap s the only advanta.ge that labor 
gained f rom the Clayton Act is found in Section 6 which makes 
lmions lawful organizations ~ ~· 
In the or·iginal Sherman proposal there had been an 
exemption provided for labor and. agricultural organizations 
f rom the act. Only one objection was raised to this exemption , 
I 
I 
bill by I 
My purpose 
throughout the Senate debate on the bill and yet the 
passing through several committees was emasculated. 
in mentioning this point is to indicate the legislative intent 
in this act~ 
In the federal spbere we find a b road use of the 
the major s tril.i:es. 
,, 
I
I The instances included the Pullman Strike, 
cou rts from the 1890's tbrough the early 1930 1 s in defeating 
the Northern Pacific Case, the coal strike of 1919, and the I 
shopmen 1 s strike of 1922. The injunction itself was a major 
3638 Stat. 780 
32 
L 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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weapon in thi s period. The Hit cbman Deci s ion of 191738 uphe ld II 
the yell ow- dog , or ant i-union , contract and dating from this 'I 
time the injunction was b roadly used to present organizational I 
a ctivity where worke rs were en~loyed under non- union contract . I 
John Mitchell of tbe Coal mine union , afte r beine; faced with 
I 
the injunction stated that no we apon had been used \V i th such 
disastrous effect against trade union s as had t he injunction 
in labor disputes . The widespread use of the injunction by 
employers is proof' in itself of this statement . One oi' the 
greatest difficulties throughout the period was the widespread 
disrespect for our court system brought abm1t by the pract i c-
a l ly unlimited use of tb.e injunction. This disrespect le ads 
further to a comp l e te attitude of contempt for all law and 
order and even for government itself . Whe n u.nion gro·ups found 
I 
t h i s weapon turned agai nst them and no adeuate defense provide , 
is it any wonder t ha t in tbeir bitterness they condemn our · 
whole legal system. 
During this same early period of the 20th centui"'Y 
c ertain activities were taking place at the federal l eve l whi c 
were i nimical to the r i ghts oi' l abor . The Clayton Act which 
apparent ly had been a heaven sent aid to l abor was s o inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in the Duplex Case39 a s to not 
app l y to an organizational strike. That is a stri ke for the 
38Hitchraan Coal & 
3 9Duplex Printing 
Coke Company v . Mitchell, 245 u. s. 229. 
Company v. De e ring, 254 u. s. 443 (1921 ) 
I 
I 
33 
purpose of persuading others to enter into a union. Ivir . J"us -
tice Bra.n.deis di ssented vigorously because he felt that the 
purpose of the Clayton Act was to widen the "allowable area 
of' economic conflict" . Al so he felt that the court \Vas usurp-
ing legislative power in setting the limits of possible con-
flict. The actual result of' the Duplex decision v;as to limit 
labor's protection under the Act to the r i ght to j ury trial 
in contempt proceeding s and to prompt hearings on temporary 
restraining orders. As to the first of these - regarding con-
tempt - it took another Supreme Co·urt decision to uphold the 
legisla tive power to limit the f'ederal court .40 
We find then that the labor inju.nction, the successor I 
to the conspiracy doctrine, gains much statur•e in the United 
1 
Sta tes and more particulal"ly in Mas sacbusetts . Despite the 
decision in the Connnomvealth v . Hunt case we f'ind the injunc-
tion used as a means to curtail the legitimate objectives of 
labor such as the right to organization and job protection. 
The federal lavis and decisions of the period serve only to 
furthe r the restrictive influence of the injunction in Massa-
chv.setts. Our state courts have new f'ederal precedents to 
I 
serve as the basis for limiting the activities of labor. Both / 
our st a te le g isla ture and the Congres s have f a iled in the ir J 
attempt s to make the road of ls.bor smooth. The st a te pe a ceful 
40Michaelson v. u. s. 226 u. s. 42 (1924). This case also 
served as the pasis :for like limitations by st a te legisla-
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tures. Massachusetts :finally adopted sucb. a limi tation i n l 
1935 (~.L.Ch.220 Sl3A) . This applies only to a crimina l cont mpt. 
35 
persuasion statute and a l so the anti-injunction statl.J:L::; fail 
to accomplish their ends, and , at the same time, a federal lmv 
intended to free ·labor from the anti-tru st provisions i s turne 
ab out to become the instrume nt of oppression instead of de l iv-
erance .. 
that even the more c onservative political group felt that labo_ 
needed protection from the flagrs.nt rn.isu.se of the i n j unction. 
I 
_j 
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CHAPTER III 
Massachusetts Leg isla tion, 1932-1947 
Th5.s chapter will review t h e vario11s p ieces of labor 
legislation , concerning the injunction, whlch were passed i n 
the period from 1932 to 1947. The method vdll be to point out 
t he significant parts of the fede ral legislation and then to 
compare these federal l mv s to our Mas sachusetts laws. By so 
doing it vv i ll be possible to grasp the reasons vvhy our state 
legislation fell short of the f ederal mark in relieving labor 
from contl'Ol by the use of the injunctive process. 
With the year 1932 a new and liberal policy toward 
labor was adopted by the federal government . We find that 
the right of railway employees to j oin unions if they so de-
sired.2 From these beginnings we can see the formation of sam 
new ideas in regard to labor ·which were not to be fully accom-
I 
I 
plished until after 1932. In the year 1932 the Norris-LaGuardi I 
1Miller, Glenn W., American Labor a_n.d the Government , (Prentice 
Hall , Inc., New York , 1948) p. 308. 
9 
~Ibid 
or Federal Ant i- I n j unction Act ·was passed. 3 
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Following this , I 
vdth the New Deal, we enter a whole nevv era of p rogressive 
social legislation, including the guarantee to labor of the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. This Y:ras accom-
plished first under Section 7 (A), of the National Industrial 
Recovery -6-ct4 and later vvhen this act was overt:b...rmvn as Ull.con-
stitutional, under the Wagner Act5 • This new policy was re-
fleeted i n many states after the year 1932. Massachusetts, al- 1 
though hesitant to leap immediately into a completely new philo ~~ 
sophy regarding labor, did follow this federal leadership to 1 
some extent. I 
The first reaction to the new policy came about in 
Massachusetts in J une of 1933 wi t h the e.mending of the Peaceful ! 
Persuasion Act of 1913. The i mportanc e of this law in relation II 
I 
to the injunction is great, as the injunction was constantly I 
used to prohibit the right to picket or othervvise attempt to I 
I 
persuade others to a id in a labor dispute. The original iict jl 
had permitted the use of pee,ceful pe rsuasion but with the amend~ 
ment the following was added: 
• .••••• nor for attending in the coul'·se of 
a lawful tre.de dispute, at any place where 
such person or persons may lav;fully be, for 
the purpose of peacefully obtaining or com-
municat ing information, or of so persuading 
or attempting to persu ade.6 
347 Stat 70 u. s. Code 
449 Stat 195 (1933) 
549 Stat 449 (1935) 
6General Laws, Chap. 149, Sec. 24 
I 
I 
II 
It would seem app arent that these words intend to allovi labor 
I' ,I 
to picket at the place of a l abor dispute and thus to conrrruni~ jl 
cate the ir side of the story t o other vYorkers and to t h e publlCjl. 
Despite this amendment coming at a time when the public mi nd I 
f avored more freedom for l abor, it did not promote l ab or 's 
c ause a s effectively as mi ght be supposed . The words of the 
I 
act 1;.rhich caused t h e difficulty were na :lawful trade dispute" · 1 
These ·words have been interpreted many times in Massachusetts 
and we find that they are a constant source of difficulty for 
7 labor • The old precedents vvere still on the books to influ-
ence the interpretations and decisions . It is difficult for 
any court or system of courts to put aside the cloe~ of prece-
dent and come boldly forth with a n ew interpretation. The few 
that 
lost 
are viilling to undertake such a task are but feeble voices! 
in the s11~rell of voices chanting precedent . Of course, an II 
outstanding few, such as Holmes and Brandeis are able to make I 
themselves hegrd and felt in the current of l aw . 
"Lawful trade disputes" cont inue d to b e held to a 
very narrow interpretat ion which excluded such items as the 
closed shop , or picketing by non-employees. With this it can 
be s een that the conspiracy doctrine , which had been watered 
I 
down to merely . a civil offense was still exte.nt in J,Tassachuset 1s. 
7Rice, etc . , Iron Foundry Company v . Willard, 242 Mass 566 , 
136 N. E . 629; Folsom Engineering Company v. 1"'IcNeil 235 Mass 
269, 278 126 N. E . 479; Simon v . Swachman, 301 Mass 573, 18 
N. E. (2d) 1 . 
38 
In practically all other j urisdictions the conspira cy doctrine 
vms losing its hold , but in Massachusetts it vms still stroDg. 
The definition of the term appears a gain and again a s t h e key 
to control, it vvas perfectly permissible to bargain. As a_11. 
evaluation of the problem raised by t h is term it mi ght be w~ll 
to note that the economic strength of bargaining still law 
with the employer in Massachusettsa Since t h is was the c ase 
the employer v1as satisfied to maintai n the status quo, while 
labor sought change. 
As ' has be e n pointed out in the foregoing material 
r~Tassachusetts had not responded to the e a rlier moves of the 
federal government during and afte r '\Norld Viar I; but 1:v i th t h e 
coming of the Norr is-LaGuardia Act the corinnonwealth did at-
tempt to make some cll.ang esa Since thi s act vras the key to 
labor' s :free dom, and, more to the point, was the model for our 
st a te legislat ion, let l.l.S examine the l:cey provisions of the 
federal act and then compare them vrith the Massachusetts coun-
terpart. The :first of these sections reads as follows: 
Section 4. No court o.f the United States 
shall have t he j urisdiction to issue any 
r 'estraining order or temporary or permanent 
injunction in any case involving or growing 
out of a labor dispute to prohibit any p er-
son or persons part icipating or interested 
i n such dispute (as these terms are herein 
de:fined) from doing , ·whethe r singly OI' in 
concert any of t 1~ follovling act s: 
39 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any 
work or to remain in any r ela tion of employ-
ment; 
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of 
any labor orgru~ization or of any employer 
organization regardless of any such un der-
taking or promise as is desc r ibed in section 
3 of this act; 
( c ) P aying or giving to , or with..ho lding 
from any person participating or interested 
in such labor dispute , any strike or unemploy-
ment benefits or insurance, or other money 
or things of value; 
(d) By all la·wful means aiding any person 
participating or i nteres ted in any labor dis -
pute who is being proceeded agai n st i n , or is 
prosecuting, any action or suit in any court 
of the United States or of any states ; 
(e) Giving publicity to the existence 
of, or the facts i nvolved in, any l abor dis-
pute , whethe r by advertising , speaking , pa-
trolling , or by any method not involving 
fraud or violence; 
(f) Asse mbling peaceably to act or or-
ganize t o act in promotion of their interests 
i n a labor dispute ; 
(g) Advising or notifying any persons of 
an intention to do any of the acts heretofore 
specified; 
(h) Agreeing wi tl.J. othe r persons to do 
or not to do any of the acts heretofore speci-
fied; and 
( i) Advising , urging, or othervdse causing 
or inducing vii thout fraud or violence the acts 
heretofore specified, regardless of any such 
undertaking or promise as is described in sec-
tion 3 of this ac t.s 
By comparison the Massachusetts sta tute fails to delineate any 
of these privilege s of labor. In itself this i ndicates the 
narrowness of purpose of the Massachusetts leg islature in pass-
ing its equiva lent anti -injunct ion procedure. IViassachusetts , 
first i n 1914, as has bee n reported, and l a t er i n 1929, attemptEd 
40 
to place anti-in j unction statute s on the book:s. Now with a 
vrell n orlre d out ant i -injunction meG.sure , Massachusetts a g a i n 
:fai ls t o achieve all that c ould have been accompli s hed. In 
t he second me ntione d s ec tion of t he act v,-e :find a defin ition 
· of 11 labor dispu te ' which is much b roader and more inc l usive 
than a.:nyt hing whi ch had t hus :far appeared. Again cons ervative 
precedent bound I.'Iassaclmsetts re f used to t al~e t he full step 
forw a rd. By :fa iling to d o so t h is ste_te me l-ely reiterates 
her p revi ous stand in new ·words and insofar as the breadth o:f 
de fi n:Ltion is c oncerned, f ai l s to move forward at a lle Let 
us c ompare these t wo de finitions as they appear i n the :federal 
code a:.r:td in the Massacllus e.tts g eneral laws. 
Norris-LaGuarclia 
(c) Th e term 11 labor dispute" 
i ncludes any controversy con-
ce r r, i n g terms of conditions 
of emp l o~nnent, or concern ing 
t h e assoc iation or re~resen­
tatlon of persons negotiating , 
fix ing , mai ntEtin i ng , changi ng , 
or seeking to change terms or 
c ondi tions of emp loyrnent , r e-
gardles s of vvheti1er or not the 
di spu_.t ~.:mts stand in the proxi-
mate r e lat i on of emp l oyer and 
emp loyee. 9 
Mas sac husetts General Laws 
{c) Th e term "laboi• dispute 11 
vr __ en use d in the sections he r -
inbef' ore referred to , i nc l ude 
any controversy concern ing I 
terms or cond:ltions of' e mp l oy 
ment, or concerni ng the asso-
c i ation or rep~e sentation of' 
persons in negotiat i n g , fix i n , 
mai ntai n ine; , changing , or see'-
ing t o arrange , terms or co:i.1d -
tions o:f emp l oyment.lO 
Th e l ast clause of the :federal act is the key to tlJ.e ·org_a n izi 
free:dom of l abor and that clause is not found i n the Massachu-
s ett s statut e . Therefore, if at any t i me a union seeks to 
947 Stat 20 u. s . Code 
10Massac husetts Gene ral Laws , c. 1 49 , S9A 
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orc;e.nize the workers of a non-union e stablisl:unent , a l abor 
d · ~.- ' t -vi .~.. and n __ o pro{-ec+·_·i on_ l.· s available under"' lspu~e aoes no - e~_s LJ _ v v ~ 
Iiiassachusetts la.v: frolil the bringing of a suit in equity for 
· 1~~•1nc~ ~o~ or restral· - ~,_--l1.g orde~ a0~ainst such activitv. an l .. c.J ·'-·-- v.L H _ ~ .!. ,] The 
federal 18.w vvas sufficiently strong to allow to l abor a com-
p l ete f reedom of action vvhich parallele d t bat of business asso-
ciations. It did not set up economic i ntervention by the gov-
ernment on behalf of tbe union but it a llowed mee.sures of se lf 
he l p vrb.ich had never before existed by removing the judicial 
restr·ictions which had blocked the way.ll The act i n itself 
was as revolutionary a piece of legis l a tion as had ever been 
passed on the subject at the national l evel. It did however 
indic f:'_te the trend of the times and many st'ates adopted the 
l aw alEJ.ost to the letter. 12 The most important featu1 ... e of t.c1e 
lav,r wl'lich v1as adopted by Massachusetts v1as in regard to the 
temporary restraining order. Thi s was a complete adopt ion of 
the federal l aw which limited the temporary order to five days 
after wh ich time it was to become void . Nor could the tempol"'-
ary restraining order be r e newed upon expirat ion of the five 
day period. 
The first effects e.s indicated took place in 1934 
while other change s occurred in 1935. Chapter 407 , Ac ts and 
Resolves 1935 , was a most important piece of l abor legislation. 
11Gregory , op cit, p. 197 
12Millis and Montgomery , op cit , p. 647.(Colorado, Idaho, India a, 
Utah in 1933 Louisi a na 1934~ Maryland 19 35 
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Section one of this chapter limits the liabili t~y of the office s 
of l abor organi z8.tions partic i pating in a labor dispute. With 
this act the l iability is limited to thos e si tu.ations vrherein 
t he le ader actually parti cipated , authorized or r 8.t ified un-
la 'vful a c tiv i ties of t he membe rsh ip . This section prevents 
t he use of equity to embarras s or chast ise uni on offi cers for 
the unauthorized a c t i vities of union members . The section 
also contains the definition of l abor dispute which has pre-
v iously been not:;ed , a n d which d oes not apply to non-employees . 
It is in sec tion four of this chapter that a very 
detailed deline ati on of the C011m1on law restrictions is speci-
i'ically spe l led out , and the i s suance of the labor i n junction 
set wi thi n its bounds . Further , the section l"equires the post~ 
·i ng of a surety by the compl ainant suffic i ent 11 ••• • to recom- II 
pense those en j o j_ned for any loss , ex:Jense or d ama.e;e caused by 
the i mprovident or erroneous issu ance of s·uch order or injunc-
+-: l' on . ul3 
v The sec tion a lso provides t hat injunctive relief 
will not be granted in any case whe r e the complainant has fail ld 
to make 11 • •• • ever;y- re a sonable effort to settle such dispute 
eitl.ler by negot i a tion or vdth the aid of available g ove rnme nt a 
machine ry of mediat ion or voluntary arbitration • • • 11 • 14 The 
parties tot h e dispute are given addit ional p r otec tion by t h e 
nex t provision vrhich requires the j udge , upon t he request of 
13Mas saclmsetts Gene ral Laws , Ch . 214 , S9A ( 2 ) 
14Ibid. Subsection ( 4) 
_j 
any party to the dispute , to report any question of l avv i n -
valved in the issue to t h e Supreme Judicial Court an d to s t ay 
hearing s i n sofar as t his can be dome vr i t h out d D.ma g e t o the 
rights of t he p arties until such question of law is r e solve d . 
The decision o:f t h e justice of t h e s up:r•e me judicia l court s hall 
be final but without prejudice to the r aising of t h e s ame ques-
tion before the full court upon report or appeal. Th e last 
change which is made b y Ch8_pter 407 is t h e add ition to Cgapter 
220, of t wo new sec t ion s pertain ing to c r i mi nal con temp t a ris-
ing out of a labor injun ction. The first of t h ese is Section 
Thirteen A VThich requil~es a speedy and public trial , before a 
jury for such crimina l contempt; and secon d, Section 'l'h irteen B 
v,rhich provides :for t h e removal o:f t h e judge wh o ruled the con-
t empt as presiding justice in t he trial provided i n Section 
Th i r teen A upon request of t h e defendant. This makes a great 
ch ange in the cornrnon law which did not allo·w j ury trial for 
any contemp t cas e an d vrhich always did permit the justice who 
had ruled t he contemp t to sit in j u d gment upon t he offe nder . 
Contemp t is a sur(1Jnary process by the comm.on law. 
In 1937 the Massacbusetts leg islature adop ted a law 
modeled on the Vlagner Labor Relations Act15 of the federal gov-
ei"r1rnent. The effect of this national act is well known due to 
its success. The Massac J._usetts Labor Rela tions Act16 , a lthough 
I 5 49 Stat 449, 1935 
l6Mass General Laws, Ch ap. 150A 
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·I 
it did not differ significantly in wording from the federal 
act, was never quite t h e success that the federal act was. 
The only added feature in the Massachusetts Act was the estab-
lislrrnent of an unfair labor practice on the part of labor , the 
sit-down strike. What seemed at the time to be a most impor-
tant p art of the act was t h e definition of labor dispute wbich 
now be c arne a copy of the federal ac t by tb.e addition of the 
clause 11 ••• regardless of wheth el' the disputants stand in the 
11 
proximate relation of employer a:nd employee. 
I 
In the years 1938 a_nd 1939 theT'e were t vf o oth er chang ' s 
in labor legislation in Massachusetts which merit consideratio ' 
The se changes referred to an expansion of j urisdic tion of t h e 
board Oln c ndl' ll' a~,· or a.na' b ' t . . 17 ~ th d . ~· f o _ ~- 1 ar l ra~lon o e es1gna 1on o· 
approori ate units for col1ectiv e bargaining purp oses. 1 8 The se 
have an i ndirect effect upon the labor injunct ion by either 
removing ca.use for disput e or by estab lish ing new prelimina ry 
require1nents upon those who sought injunctive process . 
This was t he end for our purposes of labor l egisla tio 
in Massachuse tts until after \Vorld War II . During the war 
period most unions were willing to cooperate on the war ef'f'ort 
and their \!Vork stoppage s and labor• disputes fell to a n egli-
gible nmnber. With the end of war, however, we find a new 
17C364 Acts and Resolves 1938 
18C318 Acts and Resolves 1939 
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vmve of l abor dlsputes of various t y:9es and clos e up on t he 
h eels of such disoutes, new and r~sLrlc~~ve l a uor legis l a tion 
v:h ile t he deba t e regar ding a new and re st:r·ictive labor l aw at 
the nationa l l E-v e l was be i ng held , our leg islature a lso -...vas 
moving toward r estriction . The first indication came in J une 
of 1947 with th e r e-classi f ying of a jurisdictional dispute . 
Th i s re c l a s s i f icBti on put such dispute again vd thin the s c ope 
of t he in,j uncti on pr ovision of our l aws (Ch. 214 ). I n t his 
sect,i on the j urisdicti onal dispute is de f ined and made subj ect 
to re stra i ni ng orc er if the ~Jarties do not foll ow a rbi tration 
I t would s eem to tbe author tha t this is the best way fo r sue~ 
dispute s to be handled, for nothing so irritate s the public o~ 
causes s o much ill will for organized labor as the j urisdicti !I n-
a l di spute. The ma jor change effected in 1947 is a direct 
result of the Taft-Hartley amendment to the l'ifational Labor 
Relations Act. 'I'he title of the Massa chuse-L ts act is self 
explanatory: Peaceful Settlement of I ndust ria l Disputes Dange ~ ­
ous to blic Health and Safety. 19 The provisions of the act 
established as the policy of the commonwealth, the pl acing of 
the bonds of av oiding interruption in the production or dis-
t ribut ion of certain nec essary g oods a nd services upon employ 
2 11 
ers and the employee's freely chosen representatives. v In 
19Has sachusetts Genera l Laws, Cl50 B. 
20Ibid. 
4 6 
the event that such disputes cannot be settled by the parties 
through collective barga. i ning , provision is made f or governrr:ent 
interve n tion. In this event the governor may require the p arties 
to appear before a moderator .for arrangement o.f m"bitra tion, 
seize any p lant or facility necessary to protect public health 
or safety. Dul"ing any such seizure wages and h ours ai' e to re-
main t:C1e sarne; s trilces are to be unl e:uful , but a n individual 
may no t be re qu ired to viork . Also the a ct limits l egal and 
equ i t...able relief to the Cornn:onv1ealth alone during such an emer-
genc~y. 1!H th this sun:rn~ary Vie conclude the legislative changes 
V·Thich l! ad taken place durins tlle period from 1932 to 1947. 
T 'le purpose of this chapter was to indicate the tren d of legis-
l ation during a progressive period in our usual ly conserva tive 
state~ 
The l egislature did act in ke eping viith the trend of 
the times but , as many lecislatures do , the r:Tassachusetts 
legislature failed to be as explicit as it might have been. 
As a result of the clol).diness of certain issues in the l aw v1e 
find tha t t h e courts fail to make the ad j ustment which the law 
makers apl::Jarently intended. The next step in our process i s 
to investigate the actua l resu.l t of these legislativ e cha:l'lges 
by reviewine actual cases i n the period~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
'rhe Interpretation of the Co·urts, 1 935-1947 
The changes i n the Mas sachu setts law have been de-
lineate d i n the p revious cha.,pter . Now let u s examine actual 
c ase resu l ts under t h e cb.ange d l aws and comp are t hem with de -
ci s ions prior to 1 932 in TvTas s a c husetts an d a lso n i th si:raul-
tane ous dec isions in the Un ited States Supreme Cour t. The old l 
the point where the I 
:federal g overnme:nt had passed such l aFJ s as t he Harris LaGuardia 
. ' d ' ,., L , I 11.c·c an ·c_le 11agner aoo 
sufficient h 1pact upon I 
p rece dent s had con tinued at l east up to 
Act , t he National I ndustr i al Relations 
Relations Act . But h a d t he se acts had 
II 
t h e st a te l aw s and particularly the l aws of Massachu se t ts t o 
make any r e volutionary change? It is Yiell to examine t he l aws 
but even more i mportant t o exami ne the c a s es d ecided a ft er the 
pas s age of these l aws. Here -vve b.8.ve the tr1.1e test of l ab or ' s 
lega. l progress . For our purp ose Vi e s hall exami ne the qu estion 
of picketing , especially strange r or organizational p icketing ; 
the s econdary boycott; the closed shop a s an e nd of con ce r t e d 
activi ty ; and t he general question of' union security a s posed 
by the maintenance of membersll.ip clause . . For this puPpose we 
s hall t race the opinions of the Supreme Judicial Cour t of' I,'las s -
achusetts i n sever a l l eadi ng cases v1hich a dequately smmnarize 
the l aw on t he se points in our commonwe alth. 
The first case we s~J.all investigate is Hubrite Infor-
mal Frock s v. Kramer 1 which occurred in 1936 . In this c ase 
the union set up p icket lines about the place of business of 
the plaintiff , a d r ess m~mufacturer . In the lovv-er court an 
injunction was granted against two of t l:..e defendants because 
of t heir abllse of the privilege of picketing by the use of 
t h reats or otb.er unlmYful acts . Because the statute under 
v1h i ch prosecu tion was u ndertaken had not been tested the trial 
judge, Crosby, reported t h e case to the Supreme Judicial Court 
for hearing by a single j ustice, as required by Statute 1935, I 
Ch apter 407, Section 4 . J udge Crosby had is s ued the i n junctio_l 
upon t h e b a sis of t h e unlawful a cts committed b y t wo of the de jl 
fendants. His findi ngs included t hese: the employees of the 
compsn~y we i'e not union members ; there was no dispute betvieen 
the comp any and its employees regal"ding wa ge s, hours or workin. .1 
condition s and finally, that t h e employer h a d not failed to 
comply with all r equirements of St a tute 1935, Chapter 407, 
Section L1 by making all reasonable efforts to settle a dispute 
within the meaning of tb.e statute. What precisely do these 
facts me8n? As to the unlawful acts and threats t h ere is no 
question. But let us l ook at t h e rest of t b e facts. The 
court must have felt that the law was intended to allow strang r 
picl;:etin g , since Judge Crosby only enjoined those defendants 
vTho were commi t t i ng unlawful acts, and did not enjoin t!.:wse 
l297 Massachusetts 530 
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who we r e picketing peacefully. As a result of h is doubt on 
t h is point he reported the c a se to the Supreme J udicial Court . 
In the decision, hmvever, we do find t h e old elements arising . 
There was no lawful dispute because tllere was no employer-em-
p loyee relations and furtl2.er the dispute was not concerned wit 
wages , hours or v1orkin8 conditions . The Supreme J udicial 
Court on appeal heard the case and upheld the lower Court a l-
thou gh it reversed the o:eclei' for injunction since it was no 
loneer necessar'y. (It is a principle of equity that an injunc-
tion vdll not is sue vrhere the situation has so changed as to 
make it unnecessary or useful.) In addit ion the Supr e me Judi-
cial Court did not rule upon the constitutionality of the Stat-
ute sin ce the question formerly at bar had become moot. 
Thus we see that in the first case after the char18es 
in the lav; t h at t :>:! ere have been no real changes i n the right s 
of labor. 
The case reported above took place before the a doptio_ 
by our legislature of the n ew definition of labor dispute, but 
our next case arises after its adoption. 'I'he case (Simon v. 
Svr achman) 2 is a very adequate deline a tion of the law of our 
commonvlealth in 1938. This is t he period following the adoptio 
of the state labor relat ions act containing the above mentioned 
definition of l abor dispute ~ 
2 . 
3-0 / Massachusetts ~~ · 
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I 
The case itself arose v'hen a meat cutters uni on tried 
to organize tbe employees of Samue l Sj_mon . The eml)loyer oper-
ated a s mall sb.op ( 3 employee s) and was only one of a number o ' 
sl10ps ·wh:'L ch the union attempte d to organize. The e mp loyees 
vrere not members of any labor union , nor did they engage in a 
~-
dispute wi th the employer. Since the employees •Here working 
longer hours for less pay than union st andards, the l..J_nion 
wi shed to organize them in order to maintain their standard. 
The parties agree that the picl\:eting was peaceful and 
ordeply ru1.d that only one p icket was a ctive at any time . r:L'he 
question involved in the case i s ~;vhether or not p e aceful pick-
eting fop the purpose of inducing t h e p laintiff t o enter into 
a contract recognizing the uni on a s bargaining agent, and , 
u n der certain con ditions, sole Sll~) l;lier of l aboT', is l awful . 
Both l)B.r ties also agree tha t t h ere is no doubt tha t such an 
activity vras unlavvful prior to 1935.3 The c ourt a l s o points 
out that the r i ght to strill:e is one protected by the common 
law when it concerns higher wages, shorter hours or better 
vrorki nc; condi tiffins . Thi s right was established as early as 
184 2 (Co:tnri10nwealth v . Hunt ) in Massachusetts and s ays the cour · 
has not been challenged since . 
3Vlalker v . Cronin 107 Mass 555; Vege l alm v . Gun t ner 167 Mass 
92; Trl.1ax v. Corrigan 257 u. s. 312; Comm. v. Libbey 216 Mass 
356 ; Godin v . Niebubn 236 VIass 350 ; A. T.Stearn Lumber Co. v . 
HovrlE.-l:;t 260 Mas s 45, 56 , 59. These cases hold that both the 
right to l abor and the rj_ght t o carpy on business are liberty 
and P T'Operty and any i nterference with them i s unlawful un-
less j ust ificati on is shown. 
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The next step by the court is to i nvestigate the 
right to picket peaceful ly . This is found to be a l egal e n -
terp r i se v1hen unaccompanied by violence and when it occurs in 
Lt 
the course of l m•Jful labor dispute .- The que stion then 
8.rises i n this case as to v!hetr:er there is a lawful l abor dis-
p u te e:;dsten t. 
The court in this regard states that the right to 
strike and picket is tbe exclusive rie;ht of the employees of a 
given employer. Th ere mu st be found 'livithin the unit of e mploy e 
and elnployer the cause of a lawful trade dispute. In ox•der i'or 
the 1.m5 .. on to t ake such action it nust have contra ctual re l atio: s 
vJi th the employer . 5 The u n ion in answe r to this re l ies upon 
t h e l egis l ation undertak en from 1935 onviards a s its right to 
e n g a ge in such coercive action. 'I1he cou1-.t reviei:7S our 11 baby 11 
Norris La Guardia Act and does not find in it the defin ition 
contained in tJ: .'e fedePa l act . Whe re such a definition does 
appear is i n Chapter 345 of the Statutes of 193 8 . The court 
ctd.n!i-1~ 8 that S1J.cb. a d_efil1i tion_ is existent vvhich br~ o c:tdens Jche 
dei'ini tion of 1abor disp·ute to i nc1 ude t h ose not in an employe -
e l21p l oyer relationship ; but }::colds that it does l'lOt app l - here . 
The ste.tute quoted is the StEJ.t e Labor Re 1 at i ons Act and the 
term as dei'inecl is for use in tb.e act a1one . Thi s wou.ld seem 
4 rv'Iass Ge ne ral Laws, Ch . l49 , Sec. 24 as amended by Statute 1933 , 
Ch. 272 
5Eoban v . Dempsey 217 I\Ias s 166 ; Tracey v . Osb orne 226 Mass 25 ; 
Gazette v . c. V. Watson Co . 245 Mass 577. 
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at once to be a little difficult to follow. The leg islatuJ 
say s the court, has broadened the scope of labor dispute i n 
regard to the st&.te labor relations act but not in regbrd to 
the use of peaceful persuasion. 
Despite the result obtained by such reasoning the 
court chooses to follow such a course. The court maintains 
that it can only read and interpret the law; it cannot read 
in what is not explicitly found there. As a final state-
ment the court finds that since no lawful trade dispute 
existed, Mr. Simon was under no legal obligation to bargain 
with the union. The lower court refused to issue an in::- -· 
junction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed this finding 
and remanded the case for damages. VVhile the case was 
on appeal an agreement was reached by the parties which 
removed the ns ed for an injuncti on. However, since .Mr. 
Si mon had suffe r ed damages by the union's activity before 
the agreement, he was entitled to recover for such aamage 
even though the need for the injunction had passed. 
It is quite apparent from this case that t he commor -
we alth had not changed its subst&ntive law by the statutes 
which had be en forced through in l S35. Or perhaps it -w ould 
be better to say that the courts could find no such substantj~e 
c hEmge. Let us investigate further with a similar case whic[h · 
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arose i n 1939. In Quinton ' s Market v. Pat terson6 the court 
c omes to the saJ:!J.e conclusion as in the Simon v. Svwacbrna.n case 
above. Pea.ceful piclmting by non-employees constitutes unl s.w-
.ful conduct. Further the court goes on to say that benefit s 
deriving f rom a secondary boycott , sympatbetic strike ox• from 
a. combine.tion for the purpose of a closed shop do not justify 
the intentional i nfliction of injury u.pon a ple.intiff'. Again 
t h e old theory of direct relat ionship between the act and the 
advantage to the actors is brought up . 
The next case which we shall consider is rat l.:.er a 
different situation than the two previous c ases . This case 
Hamer v. Nashewana Mills7 • is concerned with a closed shop 
agreement, freely enter·ed into by both parties. 8 In this 
case t here is such an agreement and parties viho are me mb e rs 
of a rival union are seeking to overt}:.rovv the contract on the 
grounds that s u ch a contr~ct is invalid and unenforceable . 
Here a.ctually ~;ve have one of t h e few iDstances of the closed 
shop contract being upheld. But in the instant case the ob-
jection to the contract is not raised 
rather by the fellow employees of the 
by the employer but J 
union which has the agre r 
ment. How can our courts up h old such contracts and :ret not 
allmY such subject matter to be a fD?ee matter for collective 
bargaining? Usually those thing s ·which are against public 
6303 Mass 515 
7315 Mass 160 
I 
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Swhen a closed shop agreement is freely made ax1d entered into I 
_BY foth, pa~~g~==:i:l1_2-t€e~l~- F-=f!;t=,o~b~e~e<>=l=1~f._o=r=c=e=a=.b=l=e=i=n==M=a=s=s=a=-c=-l=.:l=u=s=e=t=-'-=!J=S=.#====== 
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policy are · :he l d to be illegal. Here we have a case wh ere a 
matter j_s held to be against pub lic p olicy in the one instance 
and n ot aGainst it :Ln a secon d instance. Th is SD.ro.e question 
a lso a.rises in regard to t h e i n clusion of an arbitration 
clause in a contract . Such a clau se may be included i n a con-
t ract a:n.cl be he ld enforce able by the courts but if tt_e union 
s h ould seek such a clause against t h e vfi ll of the employer any 
strike or picketing for such an end nould be enjoinable. It 
would seem tbat tr:.i s is s. l~::rwful and just end for collective 
action by emp loy e es . Th e element of coercion by t h e union is 
usually h eld to be the re a son for s u ch a distin ction but is 
this quite a tru e picture? Most uni ons are only gaining some 
measu re of the statu re of t heir opp osite number by all our 
l abor l aws . The who le effort of progre ss ive labor le g islation 
has been t o attempt to bring about equality in bargaining 
power. It wou ld seem that the emp loyer in most instai:tces 
s t ill holds the balance of power and is seldom forced into 
agreements vli thin which he is not able to succe ssfully operate 
Let us examine one more case which occurred in 1947 
and attempt to disc over if any great chan ge has occurred up 
to t his time . The case is Colonial Press v . Ellis . 9 The case 
arose over t h e question of wheth er or not tbe union h ad a righ 
to strike an d picket and to retain the maintenance of membersh 
clause in a nerv contre.ct to be negot iated. The lovver court 
enjoined such strilre mJ.d picketing. Th e Supreme Judici a l Cour 
first reiterates its statement that a strike :for t l~ e closed 
shop is illegal as regards the injunction and p oints out t h at 
t he remote objective of strengthening the union is not an ade-
quate cause for a strike under the same aspect. After exp lain-
ing t he m2.intenm~ce of membership clau se and pointing out tl:at 
it does not con stitute or create a closed, union or preferen-
tial shop, the court go es on to determine its legality. 'l'he 
court finds that the maintenance of membership clause is a 
me81"1S of strengthening the "Lmion for futur e controversy and is 
thus a str:tke for an illegal purpose. In answel'"' to the union' 
claim tha t picketing is free speech and t hus cannot be enjoinec , 
the court finds that picketing for an unla-...~·ful objective does 
not constitute free speech and may be enjoined. 
]::.,_ remarkable contrast is :found bebveen the k ey fed-
eral Supreme Co·urt decisi ons and t ho se of our state supreme 
court. In 1937 stranger p ick eting was upheld by this body in 
Senn v. Tile Lay ers. 10 This c ase had come up from Wiscon sin 
under the 11 baby11 Norris LaG-uardia Act of t hat ste.te, and con-
cerned picketing of a contractor because h e would not join a 
union. There was no emp loyer-emp loyee re l a.tionship in this 
case. Sh ort ly afterward anotbe r case arose on the same prin-
10301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857 
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ciple of stranger p lch:eti ng i n New Negro Alliance v. Sani tary 
Gro c ery Company11 , In this case tr~ e allian ce was prote s ting 
the f a ct t Lat the company 'vvou ld not employ Negroes in r espon-
sible positions . 
Again a s a contrast we find the I ron Molde rs' Un ion 
v . Allis-Chal mers Company 12 which i s concerned with the second-
ary bo;yc ot t . Although t h is is not a Supreme Court de c ision , 
it is a fede ral court dec is ion upheld on app e a l to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals . The c a se involves the p as sing a long of viork 
by the company whi ch was strike bound t o o t her f oundries ·wh ere 
me mbers of the s ame i n t e r na t ion a l .union ~;vere employed. When 
these wor kers refused to worl\: on the materi a l the company 
sought an injunction agains t the n8.tione.l 1.mion. The fe d eral 
c ourt found t~at t he worke rs we re j ust ified in refusing to 
work on the work so pas sed Hl ong by the company. 
These feder a l and Supreme Court decisions indic ate 
the national pE>.ttern in contract to t b.e l ocal pattern f'ound 
i n our state. 
Thu s v1e f'i n d that as f' ar as our state courts a re con-
corned there has be en n o real change i n regard to l abor 's 
right s in the modern progressive period. During a time when 
l abor nationally has t aken great f orw a.rd strides :--;e find that 
11303 u. s. 552, 304 u. s. 542 , (1938 ) 
121 66 Fed 45 
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the Cornmomveal th of Illassachusetts still j_)lods al ong in the 
ruts of precedent . Our legislature thru i ts half-hearted 
efforts has fai l ed to accompl i sh those ends which it had set 
out to gain.. The courts more naturally hesitant t o change, 
look to the legislB.ture to be more specific and find i t want-
ing. Perhaps i n the final analysis it is a combinati on of 
half hearted efi ort on the one hand and equally weak a pplicat on 
on the other. 
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CHAPTER V 
Current Prop osals 
I n this chapter the author hopes to point out severa.l 
o:f the problems v"Jhic:'rJ exj_s t in t :C.e stri.lcture of our l abo::-e l egi. 
lation and r ep ort and eval l)_ate some of the recent proposals to 
corre ct the p1 ob l er.ls which exist. For this to be accmil~;lished 
it will be necessary to again delve into terminology . I1'Iany of 
the concepts 1ivhich have been discussed in the foregoing mat-
erial have been sub j ected to chanc:;es in their meaning in the 
passase of years . 
Let us first invest igate picke ting as free speech~ I 
is generally a ccepted that peaceful picl\:eting is a..n exercise OI 
f r ee speech and has been held to be such by the United States 
Supreme Court on many occasions. 1 A very serious problem 
arises when any court determines that picketing i s not free 
spe ecll. In Massachusetts the courts have chosen to ignore the 
problem of free speech and enjoin picketing on the theory of' 
unlawful ends . This has generally been applied i n the case 
when picketing vras use d as a means to attai n the closed shop 
and yet the closed shop agreement has not until recently been 
l 
-Thornb.ill v . Alabama , Cerlso v . Ca lifornia, Sem1. v. Tile Laye s 
an unl a-.-iful end in i tse lf. 'I'he type of free speech ·which the 
Supreme Court has upheld has a lways been purposive free speech, 
that is , speech intended to effect rnunan conduct. Professor 
Dodd states that if a ma j ority of the Sup reme Court were ever 
con.vinced .that picketing was not an e x ercise of free speech, 
·unions would not only lose laws1_1.lts but also lose strikes. 2 
Our second problem arises in t he definiti on of labor 
dispute. In earlier statements we po inted out the distinction 
d rawn by Massacb:usetts on this sub j ect. Does not the term 
labor dispute in our time warrant the broades t possible i nter-
pretation? 'wVe as members of a highly industrial society a s 
well as a highly unionized society should be able to see such 
a need. If for certain purposes we extend our definition to 
include those who are not in the proximate relationship of em-
ployee and employer, does it not seem logical to use this sa1ne 
broad definition whereve r labor dispute is defined? This prob-
lem arises in the case of stran{Ser picketing which has also 
'7. been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 0 Massachusett 
fails to accept this broad definition as pointed out in the 
case of Simon v . Swacr ...man. Today, in terms of our modern so-
ciety • .!-]_ v is essential to the well be i ng of the con!ml.U1i ty that 
labor be allowed to protect its interests. This protection 
necessarily includes the right to picket those who are u.nder-
2Professor E.E.Dodd - LVI - Harvard Law Review (1942) 513-31. 
3se~~ v . Tile Layers, 301 U. S. 468, 57 s.ct. 857. 
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mining the very foundation of labor's economic advance. The 
broader interDretation of labor dispute will serve as a check 
1.1pon the indiscriminate use of the labor injunction. 
The next problem ·which we wi ll undertake is that of 
the secondary boycott. At first glance there ·would app ear to 
be no case for this ty-pe of activity on the part of labor, 
but further investigation should cause a different opinion. 
'l1he secondary boycott theoretically is the application of 
pressure upon neutral parties by labor organization. Let us 
examine a hypothetical case to determine wheth er or not this 
is true. The X Company , manufacturers of iron products is en-
gaged in a labor dispute with its employees represented by the 
Y Union. X Company in order to break the strike, subcontr acts 
its work to the Z Company whose en~loyees are al so members of 
the Y Union. This wou ld represen t a second~ry boycott under 
Massachusetts law if the union em:9 loyees of Z Company refused 
to YJork on the struck goods. Th is is at least one type of 
secondary boycott that should be allowed without fear oi' in-
j unct ive interference. The Nev1 York state unity of interest 
doctrine does allow such a boycott and picketing . This unity 
o:f interest doctrine is a lso knovm as folloviing t h e produ ct. 
Of course, there are cases in w·hich the secondary boycott is 
not such a clearly necessary Vfeapon of labor. 
(L,.., /, ,.- ·~"' 
The line ·-sh.~1;I:d 
be clearly drawn as in the unity of interest doctrine. Perhap 
the greatest of our difficulties in labor relations i s in the 
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broad and evasive vvordings of some of our 
ments that clearly outline what they mean 
acts. Specific stat~­
and what they intend l 
to acc omp lish are necessary particularly in some of the more 
controversial points as in t he two preceding situations. 
A..nother cause of constant str•ife in our courts a:.n.d 
als o in our legislature has be e n the problem of uni on security. 
Thi s i nclu des closed shop , prefer e n tial shop , u n ion shop, and 
maintenance of me mbership. I n Massachusetts ·wi th the single 
e x cept ion of our most famous c a se, Commonwealth v. Hunt, the 
closed shop has a l ways been he ld to be an unlavvful end of any 
strike or other concerted activity. What is the reason for 
this? Employers generally are n ot in favor of t h e closed s hop I 
because it makes the union much too strong as a bargaining 
unit. Management prea che s the doctr ine of the right to work 
as a matter of fact as Dro"'row once declared years earlier the 
only right worke r s have is "the right to go from empl oyer to 
.1. 
employer in sear ch of WOl"k 11 • • The closed s h op does permit the 
maximum in results of collective b argain ing for union worke rs 
generally. As is true VI i th man y thj_ng s in our d ay the true 
object ion to the closed s h op is b a sed n ot on the policy but 
rather on the abuses of t he policy. In addition to the closed 
shop vie have one specific problem in Massachusetts, the main-
tenance or membershi p s hop. Here the wor•ker is n ot requi red 
4clinton s. Golde n & Harold J. Ruttenberg in Un ion , Management 
and the Public, Bakke a n d Kerr (Harcourt Brace Co., N.Y., 
1948) P• 129. 
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to join a uni on , but once h e so decides he must l"'emain a member 
:for the duration of the union contract. Th is part icu l ar :form 
was declared (by way of dicta) to be illegal in the Colon i al 
Press v. Ellis Case. 5 The last type which we viill d is cuss i s 
tb.e uni on shop. In this typ e of s hop, the employer has i'I'eedom 
to hire vvhomever he pleases, but within a given p eriod of time 
t he new employee must j oin the "Lmion or b e discharged. 
The last problem settl e s about the term property. Thifi 
vyr ord h a s been variously i nterpreted by the court s for many year~. 
The r ight to do business has been str ongl y uphe ld v:rhile the 
right to work has not . Usually the case of the r i ght to work 
has been brought up at :bhe behes t of the employer vvho seeks to 
gai n hi s orm ends t he r eby . The p ract i cal solution to the prob-
lem come s in properly evaluat ine; the property rights j_nvo l ved . 
Undoubtedly the property rie;llts of a man to do business is in-
terfered with to a greater or le sser extent by a strike, p ick-
eting or boycott . However , t h ose who are striking, etc. , a lso 
he_ve a property right - the right t o vvork for a living and as 
a corollar y, I should think, the right to i mprove t :O.eir- positioffl 
as l aborers. vVe supposedly have come a long ·~>ray from the Phi l a~ 
de lphi a Cordwai ner 's Ca s e of 1806 i n which the statement was 
mad e t hat 
5 
32·1 :.' Massachusetts ~B:J , 74 N. E. 2nd 
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{ 
" a comb i nat i on of workmen to rai s e the i r 
wage s . ma~f b e c ons i de r ed f r om a-two f o l d 
po i nt of view ; one is t o benefit thems e lves , 
the other t o injure thos e who do n ot j oin 
the i r socie t y . The rule of l aw condemns 
both. " 6 
I f, hovvever , we refuse t o a llow a bal ancing of values , a 
c l a i m of j ustification in such cases , we are r eturning to the 
Dark Ages of l abor lav1 . 
With these ideas in mind le t us examine a few of the 
proposals whi ch have bee n tendered t o the MassacJ.1.usetts l egis-
lature in the last tvv- o years . I t is unnecessary to go ru1.y 
further back than this as each session seems to consider al-
most the same px'oposal s , although cel"tai n modif ications are 
f ound from year to ye ar . :j.f i th this pu r pose in mi nd and i n 
order to p oint out the opinion of the chief execut ive of ' this 
Co!YI..monv;realth , vte vdll begin by quot i ng from the inaug ral ad-
dres s of Governor Dever on taki ng office in 1949. The broad 
coverage of the address tre.ns cends OUl"' limited field but spec-
if'icB.lly in relation to our problem he makes the following 
statements. 
"There are t·wo matters vihich I regard of 
such i mporta . .nce and urgency that I speci-
fical1y recomrnend your a t tention to them • 
.. • • • I n 1935 , the Legisl e.ture adopted an 
act to restrict the abuses of' anti-labor 
in j unct i ons . Tb.is le.w W2.s closely 11odeled 
upon , but not identical with , the terms of 
the federal l'ifOT'ris-LaGuardia Act. At least 
I 
I 6Reprinted i n MilJis and Montgomery, op cit , p . 22 
I 
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in p art, ovd ng to the fact tha.t our sta te 
legi s la~ure confi ned itself to proce dural 
chm1e;es only and made no effort to a.rnend 
the sett l ed substantive la...-l Vlhich had been 
established in this ConJmonviealth by a long 
line of j udic i a l decisions , ther e has devel-
oped a wide diversence between the f ederal 
pract ice s.nd adJu_dj_c a tions and those of our 
o\vn state. 
The 1935 act has proved to be a disap-
pointment to thos e who sponsored it . 
A strike for un i on security and p ick-
eting in supp ort of the same purpose remain 
"LmlavJf u1 and subject to injunctive prohj_b iti on 
in Massachusetts . I r ecormnend tha t you enact 
a li1easure ·whicb will broa.den the defini tion 
of the la\'Yfu1 ob j e cts of strikes and p icke ting 
so tha t union security and other desirable 2n d 
l egitirne.te ends of collective bargaining and 
its lawful ec onomic sanctions may be pur sued 
in freedom from the hampering judicia l re-
straints to vvhich 1.ve 8.re bound by outmoded 
preeedents. 11 7 
As a d i re ct result of this statement by the governor several 
bills were i ntroduced into the legislative session of 1949 
which sought to attain t he ends cited. One of the first of 
thes e was the petition of t be Massachusetts Federation of Labor• ~ 
_by its legal agent , Kenneth Kelley , f or an act relat ive to 
peacef ul persuasion and injunction in l abor disputes . s At the 
same time t he C. I. o. i ntroduced the SB.me bill into trte Hou se 
of Representatives. The bill as proposed by labor would make 
seven major changes in the sta.tutes. The first of t hes e v;oulcl 
be to apply the definition of l abor dispute as found in Ch.l50A 
to the section of the law dealing with peaceful persuasion and 
injurJ.ction in labor disputes. 
7senate Ho. 1, J an. 6, l~J49, p. 26. 
8senate No . 234; J sn. 1949. 
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11 Th e tePm 11 labor disputen i ncludes any 
controversy concerning terms, t enure or 
conditions of employment, or concerning 
the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, f i xing , maintaini ng, 
chancing, or seeking to arrange terms or 
conditions of emp loyrnent regardless of 
whether the disputants stand in the prox-
imate relation of employer and employee . 11 9 
This would so reconstruct our law as to be comparable to the 
fede x• al law in this regard , and would avoid the present ob-
vious discrepancy found in using more than one definition of 
the same term. 
In the next section the political subdivisions of 
the state are forbidden to prohibit , limit or J.icense picket-
ing or p~.trolJ.ing by a l abor organization - except as they 
may be limited 8.S individuals - in the course of a l Hbor dis-
pute as define d i n the first section of this bill . This sec-
tion is also included in Ch. 150A as a covered section for the 
new defin ition of labor dispute • 
.A..11. extremely important change is inade by section threE 
of this bill in that it would add to the definitions of Ch.l49 
the follo·wing under the hee.ding of labor dispute: 11 or con-
earning terms OP conditions of union security, and regardless 
of whetl:.er the disputants stand in the pi'OXimate relation of 
employer and employee." By such a definition labor groups 
9Ch. 150A, Sec. 2, 7. M. G. L. 
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would be allowe d a s cope of activity comparab le to that a llovve d 
under the Wagner• Act, . a_11.d would for the fj_ rs t t i me be allov.red 
protection of their right to engage in a dispute for purp oses 
~ · · sect r · t v The b:r·o.n..:l_ statem.er_tt 11 union sectr_r itv,, 11 here or unl on 1_ l " • _ u 
i mplies t he closed s h op as well a s other forms of union securit:-
which is an indication of the broad reform attempted . 
In the bill there are several other i mportant concepts 
i ncluding protection against the injunction even in t he c ase 
of unlawful acts; a_n expansion of the section of Ch.l49, 9A, 
which deals with protection by p·ublic officers to inclu de 
11 
••• ags.inst acts which i nvolve violation of the crimina l law 
warranting arrest"; a statement t b.at picketing is fre e speech 
and that lawf u l trade disputes include union security disputes; 
and, finally, that as a prerequisite to the granting of the 
have been .fulfilled and all governmental mac:t inery of me di a tion 
and arbitration have be en exhaus ted. 
This bill as proposed would have solved most of the 
p r oblems which had arisen concerning the labor injunction in 
Massachusetts . The broader definitions are i n keep ing with our 
new at t itude toward labor and certainly it is not to o much to 
ask t:hat the parties to a dispute use all available means to 
settle t he ir dispute without going to the courts of l aw and 
equit~r. One point vvhich v1 as not :rnade in 1")elation to the act 
is a statement of the last section which expressly repeals all 
pi'ior acts and constructions v1hich tended to limit the activi-
ties of labor. This statement tells the courts of the Common-
wealth that they must decide their cases not in the light of 
outmoded precedent but rather in the new philosophy of lEW! as 
proposed by this bill. Here the legislature leaves no doubt 
in the n:inds of the court system, if t hey adopt the bill as 
law. 
Following this bill we find another, presented by 
Mr . Mario Umana - a legislator from Boston - Vihich attacks the 
same problem., but from a little different aspect . The state-
ment of policy at the beginning of his bill is clear cut a..nd 
allows for no question as to the intent of the bill~ 
"Whereas , the purpose of the original act 
to limit the use of injunctions in labor 
disputes has been defeated by interpreta-
tion a..nd whereas the federal govern_ment 
has limi ted and prevented the use of in-
j unctions in labor disputes and vvhere as 
peaceful picketing for any purpose is 
hereby deemed to be an exercise of the 
right of fre e speech guaranteed by the 
Constitution , the l egislature hereby de -
clares this to be . an emergency law effect-
ive upon its passage. 11 
Mr. Umana begins his bill with a master stroke - the removal 
of the power of the court to issue injunctions to private 
parties - but protects the public interest by alloviing to the 
Massachusetts labor relations cmmnission the right to obtain 
injunctions in certain cases. In this same section h e also 
sets up peaceful picketing as free speech. The labor rela.tionf 
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comr:ission is bound by a set of conditions vvhich must be ful!"' 
filled before an injunction can issue. These conditi ons in-
clude due and personal notice to the parties except i n the case 
of irrep arable damag e to the public health and safety being i m-
minenta In otber cases whel'e the le.bor relations comm:Lssion 
can seek an injunction the issuance is forbidd en until full 
findings of fact are made. When such findings are not made, 
t h e i njunction is to lG.st for five d ays and is non-renev,rable . 
Other safe guards in h is a ct i n clu de: the requirement of a re -
port to the supreme judicial cou.rt on request of eithe r p arty 
for a SUIT1111a r y h e aring by a single j us tice which is with ou t 
prejudice to a full hearing at a l ater date; a prerequisite 
to i ssuanc e of injunction t hat t h e parties have used the l abor 
re l ations machinery avai l able; a..Yld , again the statement in t h e 
act that it shall supersede all procedura l and substantive pro-
visions of l avv i n effect on passage . 
M.r . Umana 's bill is also a very vvorthy attempt to 
clarify the situation regarding l ab or injunctions ru1d to pro-
tec t the l"ights of l abor. The p olicy of reserving t o the l abor1 
r·elations commis s ion the r i ght to seek labor i n j unctions is a 
very pra ctical solution. I n this way the r i g h t s of both partie~ 
would appe a r to be protected and t h e prob l em of ill con sidered 
l egal or equivable action would be removed . Th e p e.rties to a 
dispu te are seldom coo l and clear headed enough to act on the 
basis of sound j udgment j vfhi le an agency witt.out personal i n -
terest s h ould be ab l e to do s o. 
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A t hird p r op osal :w.as made by IVlx·. J oseph Con l ey of' 
Lav" enc e , Mass a c._usetts , which s impl y r ede f'ine d t he l abor di s - I 
pute to include uni on se curi t y. These prop osals were submi tte< 
to t h e 1egi s 1 a t ive commi tte e on Labor a nd Indus tries :for c on -
s iderat :l on . Th e c om.rniss ion a:f t er examinat ion and he arings 
bro1..1.ght :f orth a comprom.i se proposal whi ch was presen te d to t h e 
legislature as House document No. 2544 . Th i s n ew bill lindts 
to s ome ext ent the attemp t by t hos e p r i marily n ote d to g a i n 
a.ll the i r end s . I t a ccepts without cha.nge the de:fin i ti on of 
picketing as free speech; the proposal to broaden l abor dis -
pute be-.-ond the proximate relationshi p of employel' and emp l oyeE 
and the theory th~t the bi l l viill r epeal a ll prior constru ct i o1 s 
i n consistent with the n ev propos al . 
l- O''Je rer , the b l ll specific all eli:•,,inat.es from the 
earlier proposals , the closed shop , a l though it does allow 
o t her :forl"lS of' union sec Lli'i ty as a l egj_ ti'JJate end for bargain-
i ng.. Al so the prOl)O Se.l of Represent ative Umana that the rig_lt 
of private parties to seek l abor in j unct i ons be eli mi nf:"'.. ted and 
such right be rese r ved to the l abor re l ati ons comni ssion has 
been deleted. In its p lace vre have the Kel l ey (Ma ssach:usetts 
Federation of Labor ) proposal that no restrai n i ng order or i n -
j unct i v e r e lief be granted except after a cert i fi c ate has been 
obtained :from the cmmni ssion of l abor and industries stating 
that the pm"t y h as complie d vd t h a ll l e g a l obligati ons and 
has made every l"easonab l e effort to settle t h e di spute h y ne-
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g otiation and with t he aid of such g over nmental machinery 
as has been off ered for mediation or arbitrati on. 
Despite the limitations i mposed by t he c 0mwi ssion 
on labor and i ndu s try t he c ompromise proposal f2iled of 
enactm~nt in the legislatu~e. It pas s ed t he House of 
Repr e sentatives but was defeated on a straight party line 
v ot e i n the state senate. This failure ended the attemptE 
to make a change in the 1949 sessi on. 
The defeat in the 1949 session however did not 
mean that those who sought changes would give up. In the 
1950 sessi on we again find ruany new pr.Jposals subuJi t t ed 
which included some of the matter we have discuss ed and in 
some cases new conce pts. It will perhaps be best to 
simply explain t he new proposals and menti on t hose which 
are being pr ,Jposed for the second time. The two principal 
bills were those pres ented by L'i.r . Umana for t he lvlas sachuset s 
F'ederation of Labor and the I'ilassachusett s C. I . 0 . , and a 
second i ntroduced by Senator Phillips and prepared· .. by 
Pro f essor Archiba ld Cox of the Harvard Law School. 
In the bill pre sented by T, .. 'Ir. Umana we find the 
term ''labor dispute 11 redefined-,to include all controversy 
concerning uni on security in addition to the other accepted 
items of disDute. 
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11 The term 11 labor disDute 11 , vLJ.e n used in 
the sections b.ereinbefore refel"red to , in-
cludes any contl"oversy concerning terms or 
conditions of erqployment (including but not 
limited to maintenan c e of membership, union 
shop, preferential shop , or othe r fo rms of 
union security ), or c on cerning the associa-
tion or re~resentation of persons in nego-
tiating , fixing , mai ntaining , changing, or 
s eeking to a rrange, terms or conditions of 
employ!l~.ent , regardless of whether the dis-
putan ts stan d in the proximate relation of 
employer and employe e , except that this 
paragraph shall not change the substantive 
law Pelat i ng to picket i ng of a second em-
ployer unless he is vvorking on, haTtdling, 
transporting or dealing ~tvith " struck goods 11 
as t b.at term is generally used in the field 
of labor relations . 11 10 
Besides this nevi definition we find a restriction on the is-
suanc e of any l abor injunction except after a hee.ring in open 
court and as a result thepeof finding that: unlanful acts have 
been or will be comr11itted; irreparable i n jury to property w.ill 
result; t hat as to each item of relief granted greater injury 
will be i nflicted on com~J lainant by denial t_.can upon de.fendants 
by such r e lief be1ng g ranted; and , finally , that t he complain-
ant has no adequa te re n:.e dy at law. Eacb. of these bills must 
aim at seve ral laws on the books in oPder to adequa tely ac -
complish their purpose. The statements above relate to Ch . 214 
v,;hi ch is the statutory basis for the issuance of injunction. 
In addition Ch . 149 als o rela tes to labor. and to peacef'ul per-
suasion. This c hapter would be amended by this bill in such 
a way as to redefine labor disputes and also to establish 
10House ;¥797, January, 1950 
72 
peaceful persuasion as free speech. 
The bill presented by Senator Phillips is a bit more 
narrow in its interrn..,etation of labor dispute. The following 
i s the definition given: 
The term 11 l abor dispute" , when used in the 
sections hereinbefore referred to, includes 
any controv ersy arising out of a ny demand of 
any character whatsoever concerning the asso-
ciation or rep resentation of persons in nego-
tiating , fixing , maintaining , cha:np::i..nr,r , or 
seeking to arr ange , terms or conditions of 
e mplo;nnent , regardless of wheth er the dis -
putan ts st and in proximate relation of em-
ployer and emp loyee. 
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this 
section, the term 11 lawful labor dispute'' in-
cludes any controversy con cern i n g- -
1) The assoc i at ion or representation of 
persons i n negoti a ting, fixing , maintaining , 
changing, or seeking to arrange, terms or 
conditions of employment ; 
2) The recognition or bargaining status of 
a labor organization; 
3) Rates of p~y, wa[!;es, hire or tenure or 
hours of employment , or working conditions; 
4) The execution or performance of an agree-
ment to arbitrate an existing or future labor 
dispute . 
5) The e xecution or performance of a collec-
tive bargaining a greement containing any law-
ful provision of a kind cornmonly found in col-
lee ti ve bargaining agreements ( incll..J_ding but 
not limited to any provision requiring a s a 
c ondit ion of e mplo:y-rnent membership in a labor 
organ ization which is t h e exclusive represen-
tative of tb.e employees i n the appropri a te 
collective bargaining unit covered by s u ch 
aD'reement when made) ; or 
6) .A:ny term or condition of emp l oyment which 
has he retofore been regarded as a lawful ob-
jective of concePted activities on the p art 
of employee s or labor organizat ion. 11 ll 
llsenate jf484 , Januru."y , 1950 ~ 
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This a ct at le ast ostensibly does permit strikes for t.~ pur-
pose of g~ining union security or arbitration clauses. But 
does this law so c are f ully word t b.ese righ ts as to avoid any 
misinterpretation? It doe s not seem that thi s is the c ase . 
The court if it wishes may still follow the old precedents by 
assigning a very narrow meaning to t h e words "execution or 
erl"OY'r.1an ce n p - - L -- e Execution coul d be interpreted to mea.n the 
agreeing and formalizing of such agreement as a vn-•itten con-
tract but it a lso may be narrowly i nt e rpre ted as referring 
only to the vvriting of such a previously made agreement . Hhat 
would this mean in regard to l abor 's rights on these points? I 
First, it vvould, or could mean that only Vihere an employer had 
previously agreed to enter i nto a union security contract woulc 
a strike for such a clause be lavrful. This then vrould be no 
adv~1.nc e or s uch a smal l advance tll.at it would mean nothing. 
Even without a change in the law an ae;reement entered i nto 
fre ely by the e mp loyer is supposed to be enforceable. (But see 
I 
quotation from Professor Witte, p. ~, ) Secondly, i t would 
again l eave i n the hands of the court the decision as to 
wheth ex- the agr eement had been made and whether or not it was 
to be enforceable. The legislature would do vre ll to remove 
very definitely any questionwhich could arise i n the mind of 
the courts . A statement of policy to i ndicate the l egi slative 
intent, such as the introduction to Representative 1Ilimna 1 s bil , 
would clarify beyond question what t h e l aw make l" s sough t to do•1 
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Th i s then sunm1arize s t h e more re cent propo s B.ls i n 
our l egisla ture vrb.ich t.1.ave b e en offered during t h e p ast two 
' • h ' • t · o u ') J. c _._ Fr"O"_·~ -:- 'L'_e se p-.L"OP o s .<:! l l years Wlll C are p e r·c l nen -co ur s 1 e ~.. •u v • -
will come any cha.11.ge i n our l aw t hat wi ll be e ffected i n the 
p re sent (1950) leg isla ture . It i s ap p arent tha t t here are 
tvvo very definite schools on the matte r of c h anging our i n -
j unct i ve law, i n addit i on to t hat group tha t wi sh to mai ntai n 
t h e stat u s quo . The fi r st group i s influenced by l abor i tse lf 
I 
a nd wants a ll restr i ct ions on organized activi ty r emoved. The l 
sec ond group i s a b it more conse rvat:tve and ~o-r i sl.1.es to ma e cer 
tain conc e s s ion s witholJ t g oing ovei•board fol" l abor. It will 
undoubtedly be a compromise betvieen these t wo partie s vihi ch 
will become l aw . Labor viill a lways settle for a little less 
t han t he ir demmJ.ds if it me ans proe;ress and in this case, 
after ti1e stone·wal l which stopped t hem i n 1949, t hey \Vill con -
pron is e to e;e t a new law p as s e d. 
Thu s a s a current pic ture we see a g o od chance of 
changes i n the Ma_ssachus e tts ant i -in j unction laws but no t a 
radical change . Progress is apt to e quite s low but at least 
t~ere will be progress . 
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CF.APTER VI 
Summary and Conclusions 
By way of swmnary we find that the injunction, an instrument of 
equity under the common law of England, was adopted to use in labor dis-
putes in that country in 1868. From this beginning we find a wide adoption 
of the device in the U. s., but strange~ enough little use in England. 
The first instance of use in the United States was in the Co1rumonwealth of 
Massachusetts. Here, in 1888, we find it applied for the first tirne in the 
case of Sherry v. Perkins. This application in Massachusetts served as pre-
cedent not only for our state courts to expand its use but also for other 
state courts and the federal courts. From this time until the year 1932 vre 
find a constant application of injunctive restraints to labor. There vrere 
few instances where the various legislative bodies attempted to stop the use 
of the labor injunction, but they were unsuccessful in both our state and at 
the federal level until 1932. 
In 1932 the federal government adopted the Norris LaGuardia Anti-
Injunction Act. This act was very successful at the federal level but its 
baby counterparts were not quite as well conceived. This was especially 
true in Massachusetts where some of the essential features of the federal 
act were eliminated from the baby act. 
Since 1932 several attempts have been made in Massachusetts to 
change our legislation concerning the use of the injunction in labor dis-
putes. 'rhe more important current proposals have been summarized in Chapter 
v. From these various proposals a new anti-injunction law was dra1~ in 19)0. 
The law is closely modeled upon the proposal submitted by Senator Christopher 
Phillips and authored by Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard University. The 
law still must be tested in the courts before it can be fully evaluated. 
However, the act does seem to contain those features which will serve to 
eliminate the difficulties which have constantly arisen in the course of our j 
labor history. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution that this work can accomplish I 
is to bring together much of the material concerning the use of the injunctiO•l 
in Massachusetts. With such a collection of data it seems obvious that an 
adequate evaluation of the injunctive process can be made. It is obvious to 
the reader that Massachusetts, although it was the first state to legalize 
the strike and combined labor activity in general, has failed to maintain 
its position of liberal leadership. Apparently a wave of liberalism sweeps 
the state and country and Massachusetts tries to follow the pattern, but due 
to inadequate framing of its legislation, it fails to fully accomplish its 
objective. This has been true almost without exception in the historical 
review which we have made. The question that now arises is, vmat of the fu-
ture? 
If Massachusetts follows the pattern of the past it is not going 
to be a progressive state, if only because of the accidents of legislative 
wording. What Massachusetts apparently needs in order to remove her laboring 
force from the sting of the injunction is a clear cut law which will accom-
plish the following: first, it must definitely recognize, and vdthout ex-
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ception, the rights of labor to strike and picket for the closed shop; 
second, it must allow similar activity to accomplish the inclusion of arbi-
tration clause in contracts; third, it must recognize the rights of labor to 
strike and picket, whether or not the parties stand in the proximate relation 
of employer and employee; and finally, it must recognize the right of labor , 
to engage in collective bargaining for all legitimate means of union securityl 
To further explain the points which are delineated above let us 
look at them a bit more deeply. The closed shop is recognized, under cer-
tain conditions in Massachusetts, as a legitimate end and an enforceable 
part of a contract. With the present size of concerns in Massachusetts there 
seems little need to worry about labor squeezing management. The unions 
have not risen to the extent that they are on equal bargaining status with 
the large concerns, and it is in these large concerns that the patterns of 
labor relations are established. As to our second point, regarding the ar-
bitration clause, it would seem to be a perfectly legitimate and worthy end 
of collective bargaining and one well within the present framework of most 
state and federal laws. This is also true in regard to other forms of union 
security. All of the points aim at the same end, a safe and sane pattern of 
labor relations with the injunction removed except where it would be used to 
prevent physical injury to property which would be irreparable. The inclu-
sian of the rights to strike and picket by non-employees is a part of the 
~~ole pattern of securing a labor movement which is mature and responsible. 
Such an end cannot be attained by the constant badgering of labor by the use 
of the injunction, nor, can it be gained by allowing the organized labor 
movement to live in constant fear that it vdll be overthrown by the great 
unorcranized masses of labor. 
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responsibility which is in the best interests of the community while in the 
!unorganized mass there is a constant threat of irresponsibility. The injunc-
tion appears to be very similar to the Combination Acts of England in the 
sense that it has caused "mutual irritation and distrust and giving a violent 
character to some unions, thus rendering them dangerous to the peace of the 
community11 • 1 This same pattern has appeared in the United States and in 
Massachusetts in the disrespect for law and the courts engendered by the 
use of the injunctive process. 
1H.esults of a parliamentary inquiry in 1824 reported in H. Heaton, Economic 
History of Europe, (Harper and Bros., N. Y., revised edition, 1948) P• 74j. 
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AN ABSTRACT 
AN ABSTRACT 
The labor injunction has proven to be a very importan 
means of control of labor in the United States. It is ape-
culiai•ly American device in use, although its origins are in 
t he English conunon law. The purpose of this undertaking is to 
trace the history and development of the labor injunction in 
its V8.rious aspects as it grew in Massachusetts. In addition 
to this accumulation of data some evaluation is attempted, al-
thougl:; this is extremely difficult for lack of a norm. 
As indicated above the labor injunction comes to us 
from British law. In very early days we find the establish-
ment of the court of the king's conscience, later to be known 
as the court of equity. One important development of this 
court was the injunction, which is an order to do or not do 
certain acts. The prime purpose of the court of equity is to 
do justice where the law cannot. So also the purpose of the 
injunction. It is to be used to maintain :the status guo when 
the rights of t he parties are in doubt. Thus if one party 
seeks ·Change while the other seeks to maintain the status guo 
it is ~pparent that tr~ injunction will not accomplish its 
purpos~~ of doing justice. This is the usual situation in a 
labor dispute. 
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==========F=============================================================~~--=~~~========= 
The injunction was first applied to a labor dispute 
in En.sland, but it was not widely used until its adoption in 
Massa,~husetts in 1888. In the case of Sherry v. Perkins the 
injun,~tion was applied to a labor dispute to prevent peaceful 
·and o:::-derly picketing by strikers. From this beginning we 
find a widespread adoption of the injunction as a means o:f 
controlling the activities of albor. This began at the state 
level but in the late 1890's appeared in the federal courts 
in t he Pullman strike. After this use the injunction was 
adoptE~d by other states to replace the old conspiracy doctrine 
which had been the prime means of labor control. 
As soon as the labor injunction became a major hazard 
due t;o its wide adoption the forces o:f labor sought to wipe 
it out. The earliest fonmal attempt was in the Clayton Act of 
1914 which aimed at removing labor from the scope of the anti-
trust laws. These laws had been a major source of the injunc-
·tive power_. The act was not successful in accomplishing this 
purpose. At the same time Massachusetts attempted to remove 
labor from the scope of the injunctive process by means of an 
anti-injunction act. This act failed because the means used 
were unconstitutional. 
The picture through the early thirties was one of 
widespread use of the labor injunction to curb labor activi-
--
ties. However, with the year 1932, and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Anti-Injunetion Act a new page is . turned. This move by a con-
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servative Republican administration indicates the power which 
was Vllelded over labor by the injunction. This cha...11.ged .feder-
al poJ.icy caused repercussions in Massachusetts which were not 
wholly adequate to overthrow the strong grip o.f precedent. It 
did however lead to the passage o.f an anti-injunction law .for 
the se:cond time in Massachusetts. The bill was modeled along 
the li.nes o.f the .federal act but had certain signi.ficant di.f-
.ferences. First, it did not remove completely the power o.f 
the state courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes; and 
secondly, it contained a much narrower de.finition o.f labor dis-
pute than was .found in the national act~ 
With the coming o.f the New Deal the whole policy o.f 
government swung to protection o.f labor in collective bargain-
ing. Massachusetts in 1933, amended its Peaceful Persuasion 
Act to permit a somewhat greater .freedom o.f action o.f labor. 
Due to its wording the act was not completely success.ful in ex-
panding labor 1 s freedom to persuade. The next step in the pat-
tern was .for Massachusetts to enact a labor relations act 
modeled on the Wagner Act. This act included the broad de.fini-
tion o:f' labor dispute .found in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That 
this W ,9.S not enough is apparent .from a study o.f the leading 
cases :~ollowing this period. The de.fini tion was applied to 
labor disputes but it did not include those weapons necessary 
to obtain a strong position for bargaining. That is, it did 
not inelude picketing, strikes .for the closed shop, or other 
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union security. Other small changes that occurred at this 
time added certain new channels to t he process of obtaining an 
injunction. In 1947 the injunction, in certain cases concern-
ing danger to public health or safety, was reserved to the com-
monwealth alone. 
In tracing the cases which occurred during this same 
period we find that in Massachusetts the injunction still is-
sued i ::1 cases where the closed shop was sought; where stranger 
or org:mizational picketing took place; where the maintenance 
of membership clause was the issue; and where the secondary 
boycot t was used, regardless of any unity of interest. 
In the years since 1947 our legislature has undertaken 
the tagk of revising our law concerning the labor injunction 
under aeveral broad headings. These are: picketing as free 
speech;: union security; the secondary boycott; and the defini-
tion of property. Under these classifica tions we find practic-
ally all t he problems of the labor injunc'tion. Despite this 
early 1:1tart no definite action was t aken until 1950. During 
t h e t hree year period numerous bills were introduced both by 
labor Emd by legislators acting on their own initiative. In th 
1950 se,ssion an anti-injunction law was passed which followed 
closely one introduced by Senator Phillips and authored by Pro-
fessor Cox of Harvard. This bill at least on the surface would 
elimina:te most of the problems of the labor injunction. Of 
course, the law must meet the test of use before it can be prop· 
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erly eyaluated. 
This work has attempted to trace the historical de-
velopment of the labor injunction in Massachusetts, with ne-
ce ssar:r references to other spheres, and the author has at-
tempted to point out the more flagrant abuses of the injunction 
in labor disputes. The present situation, with a new and un-
tried law on the statute books gives to the courts the key to 
labor' ::J future freedom from the injunction. The legislation 
has fa::;hioned the law but it is for the courts to determine 
its ef:~icacy. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX I 
J.V1ASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS, CHAPTER 214 
Seetion 9. Preliminary Injunctions and 'I'emporary Restrain-
ing Order~, When Granted, Notice . - No preliminar y injunction 
s b a ll be granted v:d t hout notice to t h e opposite party. No temp-
orary restraining order shall be grante d vvi t h out notice to the 
opp osite party, unless it shall clearly app e ar from s pecific 
f 2cts, :3hown by affidavit or by the verified bill, that i nrrne-
diate and irreparable loss or damage will result to t he appli-
cant before t he matter can be heard on notice. If in such a 
case a tem~J orary restrain ing order is granted without n otice, 
notice of the applic a tion for a prelimi nary injunction s h all be 
! made returnable at the e arliest possible time, and in no event 
later t:C"1an ten days from the date of the order, and s h all take 
p recede::1ce of all matters except older matters of the sarne c h ar-
act er. When the matter comes up for hearing, the party who ob-
tained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with his 
a pplicat ion for a preliminary injunction, and if h e does not do 
so the <:~ourt shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. 
Upon, .two days 1 notice to the party obtaining such temporary re-
straining order, the opposite p arty may appe a r and move the dis-
solution or modification of t h e order, and in that event the 
court or judg e s hall proceed to hear and determine the motion 
as expeiitiously as the ends of justice may require. Every 
temp orary restrain ing order s h all be filed or noted forthwith 
iii 
======~'··~======================================================~F========i 
This section shall not apply to proceedJ !i in t h e clerk 1 s office. 
r 
ing s in the probate court. (1913 , 515; 840.) 
Sec.tion 9 Same up to - •••.• filed forthwith in the 
clerk 's office. This section s hall not apply to proceeding s in 
the probate court or to labor disp~tes as defined in section 
t wenty C: of c hapter one hundred forty nine but shall app ly to 
1 jurisdietional disputes in accordance with section nine B (1934 , 
, 381, approved June 30, 1934; 1935, 407, Sec.3, approved July 12, 
I 
-
1935; 1~1 47, 571 '~ Sec. 1, approved June 25, 1947. Declared an 
e mergeney law.) 
Chapter 214, Section 9A. Injunctions in Labor Disputes. 
(1) No court shall have jurisdiction to issue a p relim-
inary o::> pe r manent j_njunction in any case involving or growing 
out of a l ab or dispute, as defined in section twenty C of chap-
ter one hundred and forty nine excep t after h earing testimony 
of wi t n3 sses in open court (vd th opp ol"tuni ty for cross examina-
I tion) i ::1 suppo~t of 
oath, a ::1.d testlmony 
t h e allegations of a comp laint made under 
i n opp osition t bereto, if offered , a n d e x -
cep t after findings of fact by t h e court, to t h e eff ect -
(a) That unlawful acts have been tb.reatene d and will be 
cormni tt9d un less restrained or bave been committed and will be 
con tinued unless r estrained, but no injunction or temp orary re-
i s t raining order s h all be issued on account of any t hreat or un-
lawful act excep ting ag ainst t h e p erson or p ersons, association, 
I 
or org a nization making t h e t b.reat or committing t h e unlawful actl 
or actually authorizing or not ify i ng t b e same a fter a ctual know-
ledge thereat.; 
(b) That substantial or irreparable injury to t h e com-
plainant's proper ty will follow ; 
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater in-
jury will be inflicted up on the complainant by the denial of 
1
relief than will be inflicted upon t h e defendants by the grant-
ing of relief; 
l and 
(d) That t he complainant has no adequate remedy at law; 
(e) That t h e public officers charged with the duty to 
protect the comp lainant's property are unable or unwill ing to 
.furnish a dequate protection. 
(2) Such hearing s hall be held after due and personal 
notice thereof h as been given, in such manner a s the court shal] 
direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and 
I also to t h e chief of those public officials of the city or town 
~~ wi thin which su ch unlawful have be en t hreate n ed or 
1 
cmnxo.i tted char ged with t h e duty to protect complainant 1 s p ro!'-
. erty; provided, h owever, t hat if a comp lainant s ball also a lleg e 
t hat, u nless a temp ora ry restraining order be issued with out I 
!notice, a substantial and irrep arable i n j ury to the complainant' [ 
I prop erty will be unavoidable, such a temp orary restraining order 
may be issued u p on testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustaine 
to j u st:i.fy t h e c ourt in issu ing a preliminary injunction upon a 
h e aring after notice, and a statement of t he grounds justifying 
t h e iss uance of such an order s hall be made a matter of record 
lby the court. Such a temp orary restraining order shall be ef-
I 
r-
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fective for no longer than five day s and shall become void at 
t h e expir ation of said five days and s hall not be subj e ct to re-
'newal. No tempora ry restraining order or preliminary injunction 
ls ball be issued excep t on condition t hat the complainan t shall 
! 
~ first f j_ le an undertaking with adequate security in an amount 
to be r:_xed by t h e court suff icient in its op inion to recomp ense 
those e njo i n ed for any loss, exp ense or damage c aused by t h e i m-
})rovident or erroneous issuance of such a n order or inj l:ul.ction, 
i n clu ding all reasonable costs (togethe r with a re a sonable at-
torney I:; fee) and exp e n se of de f ence versus t h e order or a g ains 
t h e g r anting of any injunctive relief sought in the same p ro-
cee d ing and subsequ ently den ied by t h e court. 
(3) The undertaking hBrein mentioned s hal l be u nderstood 
to signify an agr e ement entered into by t b.e comp lainant a n d t h e 
s urety up on which the decre e may be r e ndered in the same suit I 
I 
or p roc ee ding versus said comp lainant and surety, upon a hearing 
t o Hssure damages of wh ich h earing t h e complainant and surety I 
s hall have reasonable notice, t l:e said comp l a inant and surety 
submit t ing t h emselves to the jurisdiction of t h e court f or tha t 
I 
p Ll_r r ose. But noth ing herein contained s hall de prive any party 
1 
having a claim a cou rse of actlon under or upon such undertakin, 
from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by action at law or 
suit in equ ity. 
(4) No restrain ing order or injunction relief s hall be 
g ranted to any complainan t who h as failed to comply with any 
oblig at ion i mp osed by law which is i nvoilived i n t h e labor dis-
v 
I 
I 
I! 
I 
lp ute i n ql.i.estion , or who has failed to make every reasonable ef- J 
fort to settle such dispu tes either by negotiation or with the 
I 
aid of any available g overn.."llental machinery of mediation or 
voluntary arbi tr l':~ tion. 
(5) No restraining order, oth er than a temporary restrain-
ing ordE:r issued with out notice as provided in subdivision Two 
of t h is section, and no preliminary or permanent injunction shal ~ 
be g ranted in a case involving or growing out of a labor disputei' 
excep t on the basis of findings of fact made and filed by the \ 
court in the record of the case prior to the issuance of such 
restraining order or injunction ; and every restraining order or 
injunction granted in a case involving or g rowing out of a 
labor dispute s h all include only a proh ibition of such s pecific 
act or acts as may be expressly complained of in t h e bill of 
complai:1.t or petition filed in such c a se and as shall be ex-
p ress ly included in said statement of gro1..mds or findi ngs of 
fact made and filed by t he court as provided here in. 
(6) Wherein the court shall issue or deny a preliminary 
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dis-
pute , t he court, upon the request of any party to the proceed-
ings, s hall forthwith report any question of law involved in 
s u c h issue or deni al to t b e Sup reme Judicial Court and stay 
furt b er p roce e ding s excep t those neces s ary to p reserve t h e 
!rights of the p arties . Upon t h e filing of such rep ort, the 
~uestions rep orted s hall be h e a rd in a seeming manner by a 
justice of t he supreme j l.J.dicial court, vvho s h all with the great -
1 
vi 
\\ 
est possible expedition aff irm, reverse or modify t t e order of 
.t h e sup reme court. Th e decision of such justice of the sup r eme 
\j udici a l court u p on t h e qu estion so voiced s h all be final , but 
I 
lwi t h out p r e J udice to the raising of t h e same questions b e fore 
lt h e f u ll court up on excep tions , appeal or rep ort after a fina l 
decree in the case. 
Section 9B. Issua nce of I n j unctions in Certain J u risdic-
tion al Disputes, Socalled. - Notwith standing any of t h e p rovi -
sions of' section nine A, so far as t h ey may be applicable, a 
temp ora ry restraining order or prelimi n ary injun ction may be 
g ranted, as provided in section nine , in any c a se in v1hich t h e 
I 
!parties to a j urisdictional disp ute, as herein afte r de f ined, 
h ave voluntarily submitted such dispute to arbitra tion, and one 
of s u ch p arties fails to abide by t h e arbitration p roce dure or 
to comply with the terms of t h e arbitration award and e n g age s 
in or con tinues to eng a ge in a strike, picketing, boy cott or 
oth e r c on cert e d i n t erfere n ce a g a i n st an emp loyer . 'l'h e res tra in-
li ng order or p relimina ry injunction ma~y be g ranted in f a v or of 
I 
t h e p ar t y wh ich abides b y t h e p roce dure and comp lies wi th t h e 
award a~: well a s in favor of t he emp loyer who is r e a dy a nd will-
i ng to abide by t h e terms of s u c h award . 
II 
II 
Th e t e r m 11 jurisdictiona l dispute 11 means a dispute betvie en · 1
1 t wo or n ore labor organizations or group s of e mp loyee s t h e objec 
of which is to requ i re that p a r ticular work be as s i gned to em-
p loy ees i n a p articula r labor organization or in a particul ar 
tra de, e raft or class rath e r t han to e mploye es in ano t h e r labor 
vi i 
org anization or in another trade, cr~rt or class. (1947 , 571, 
Se c. 2 , ~~proved J une 25, 1947. Declared an eme r gency l aw .) 
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MA.SSAC HUSET'l'S GENERAL LAVv'S 
CHAPTER 214 
1Equity .Jurisdiction and Procedure in the Supreme Judicial and 
Superior Courts. 
Seetion 1. General _Equi t_x__!urisdic tion, Concurrent. - The 
supreme Judicial and superior courts s hall have origina l ru1.d 
con curr ent j urisdiction in e qui ty of all c a ses and matters of' 
j equity eognizab le unde r t he gene r a l princip les of equity j ur is-
lt p r u dence and, with reference t hereto, s hall be courts of general 
\ equity j urisdiction, exce p t that the superi or court shall have 
exclusive original j urisdiction of all suits in v1hi ch injunctive 
\relief is sought in any matter i nvolving or growing out of a 
\labor dispute a s defined in section t wenty C of chap ter one hun-
ldred a:.r1c. forty nine. ( 1935, 407, Sec. 2 , approved July 12, 1935.) 
ix 
W!ASSACI-WSETTS GENERAL LAWS , CHAPTER 149 
Se,~tion 19. I ntei•fering yJi th ~mployment Forbidden. - No 
p erson shall, by intimi dation or for c e , prevent or seek to pre-
vent a ;Jerson i'rom entering into or continu:lng in t he employrnent 
of any p erson . (1875, 211, Sec .2; P. S . 74, Sec . 2 ; 1894, 508 , 
Sec . 2; R.L. 106, Sec.ll; 1909 , 514, SS 18 , 1 45 .) 
Seetion 20. Compe lling a Person ftot to Join a Lab or Or-
j ganizat:Lon Forbidden.- No person shall , himself or by h is agent~ 
coerce or compe l a person i nto a written or oral agreement not 
I to join or become a membe r of a l abor organization as a conditior,t 
I of h is . :3ecuring emp l oyment or continu ing in the employment of 
1 
!such pe~son . (1892, 330; 1894 , 437; 508, Sec.3; R.L. 1 0 6 , Sec . 
112; 1 909 , 514 , ss 19, 145 .) 
Seetion 20 A. Same Subject; Contra cts Not to Afford Relief 
No contre.ct , wheth er written or oral , between any e mployee or 
I J. 1 d ' ' l t• 1 p rosp ec r~lve em2) oyee an n ls emp __ oyer , prosp ec lVe emp oyer or 
any otLer person, whereby eithe r party t hereto undertakes or 
promisen not to join or not to remain a member of some specified 
l ab or• OJ'ganization or any l abor organization, or of some speci -
lfied employer organization or any employer organization , a nd/Ol' 
r GO Ydthdraw f'rOLl a n employment relation in the event that he 
joins or remai ns a member of SOrile s pecified labor organization 
or any labor organization. or of some specified employer organ-
! ization or any e mployer org2.nization or organizations, shall 
I 
I 
j afford E~ny basis for the granting of legal or equ1 table relief 
.X 
I 
lby any court against a p arty to s uch undertaking or promise. 
(1933 , 351, Sec.l, effective Nov . 1, 1 933 .) 
Section 20B. Liability of Officers or Men1bers. - No of'-
ficer or member of any association or organization, and no asso-
Jciation or org anization, participating or interested in a labor 
ld iSl)Ute, as defined in section tvventy C, shall be held respon-
sible or li able in a n y court for t h e unlawful acts of i ndividual 
officerE, member s or a gents, excep t upon cle ar proof of actual 
particir ,at ion in, or actual auth orization of, such acts , or of 
ratifics.tion of such acts after ac t ual knowledge t here of. (1935, 
407, Sec.l, approved July 12, 1935.) 
Section 20C. Definitions. - For the purpose of this and 
t h e preceding section, section s one, nine and nine A of c hapter 
t vvo hundre d and fourteen, and sections t h irtee n A and thirte e n B 
of chapter t v.r o hundred and twenty , -
(a) A case s11all be held to involve or to grow out of a 
l ab or dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in 
the smne industry, trade , craft, or occupation; or who are em-
lployees of t h e same e mployer; or who are members of the same or 
1an affiliated organization of employ ers or emp loyees; wh eth e r 
s u ch dispute is (1) between one or more e mployers or association 
of emp loye rs and one or more employees or associations of employ 
. ee s; (2) between one or more employers or associations of em- I 
p loyers and on e or more e mp loy ers or associati ons of employers; !1 
or (3) between one or more employees or associations of em-
il 
xi 
II 
I 
II ployees and one or more employees or associations of emp loy ees; 
or when the case involves any conflicti n g or competing in:cerest ~ 
in a "labor dispute" (as hereinafter defined) of 11 persons parti- . 
1· cipatin.~ or interested" t h erein (as hereinafter defined l. 
I (b) A person or associ a tion shall be held to be a per-
son p articip ating or i n terested in a labor dispute if relief is 
sought a gainst h i m or it, and if h e or it is engaged in t h e sam I 
I indu str;r , trade, craft or occupation in which such dispute oc- I 
I 
c urs, o:r h as a direct or i ndirect interest t h erein, or is a 
member , officer or agent of any associ a tion comp osed in vrh ole 
in p art of employers or employees engaged in such industry, 
tre.de, eraft or occup a tion. 
ment . (1935, 407 , Sec.l, app roved July 12, 1935.) 
Seetion 23A. Emp loyine nt of Armed Guards in Connection with 
Strikes,. - Not allowed . 
Seetion 24. Peaceful Persu asion Not Penalized. - No per-
son s hall be punish ed criminally, or held liable or answerable 
I in any action at l av.J or suit in equity, for persua ding or at-
temp tint ; to p e rsuade, by prin ting or otherwise, any other 
to do an~ything, or to pursue any line of conduct not 
xii 
11 actionable or in violation of any martial or oth er legal duty, 
unless Guch persuasion or attempt to persuade is accompanied by 
injury or threat of injury to the person, p roperty, business or 
occupat:Lon of t h e p e rson persuaded or attempted to be perslladed 
or by disorder or other unlawful conduct on the part of the p er 
son per:mading or attempt ing to persuade, or is a part of an un- : 
lawful or actionable conspiracy, nor for attending, in the courJb 
. II 
of a lavrful tra de dispute, at any place where such person or pe~r 
I 
( 
sons ma~r lawfully be , for t he purpos e of peacefulJ:Y obtaining 
I or comm~micating information or of so p ersuading or attempting 
to P!=l~tade. (1913, 690; 1 933 , 272, approved June 16, 1933 .) 
xii i 
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:MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS , CHAPTER 220 
Seetion 13A. Speedy and Public Trial. - Any person who 
s hall w:Lllfully disobey any law:ful writ , p r ocess, order, decree 
1 or cow.mand of the court i-R any suit in v1hi ch injunctive relief 
is soug:1.t in ru1.y matter involving or growing out of a l abor dis-
pute, a ;:; defined i n section twenty C of chapter one hundred and 
forty- nine , by doing any act ·or t h ing in or by such ·writ, pro-
cess, o:rder, dec r ee or comrnand and forbidden to be done by h i m, 
if the ::1.ct or thing so done by him is of such a character as to 
c onsti t ·.1te a lso a criminal of fense under the laws of t h is com-
monwealth shall enjoy t he right to a spee dy and public trial 
f or hi s s aid contemp t by an i mpar t ial j ury of the county wherei ·; 
i t shall have been cormni tted; provided, t h a t this right s hall I 
not a~?p ly to contempt s co1m11:i.tted in t he p re sence of t he court 
or so n 3ar t hereto as to interfere directly with t he adminis -
tration of j us tice or apply to t he misbehavior, mi sconduct or 
disobedience of any of ficer of the court in respect to the wri t , 
order or process of this court. (1935, 407, Sec. 5 , approved 
July 12, 1935. ) 
Section 13B. Demand for Ret irement of Justice Sitting in 
_C_o_n_t_e_m~p __ t__ C_a_s ___ e. - The defendant in any proceeding 
I of court in such a case may file with t he court a 
for cont emp t ~. ~ 
demand for t hJ 
retirement of t h e justice sitting in such a case, if t he con-
tempt arises from an attack upon the character or conduct of 
' XV 
I 
i of such justice and t h e attack occurred elsmvhere then in the 
presence of t h e court or so near t h ereto a s to interfere direct-
ly wi t h the alli~inistration of j u stice. Up on t h e filing of any 
s u ch demand, prior to t h e he 2.ring in t he contempt proceeding , 
the justice s hall t h ereupon proceed no further, but anothe r 
j ust ice s hall be assigned by t h e c h ief jus t ice of the court. 
(1935, 407, Sec.5, app roved July 12, 1935.) 
I 
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ACTS OF 1914. CHAPTER 778. 
Al"'r AC'J~ TO MAKE LAWFUL CERTAIN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS 
Alr-D LJffiORERS AND TO LIMIT THE INQUIRY OF INJUNCTION IN CER-
TAIN GASES. 
SECTION 1. It shall not be unlawful for persons employed or 
seeking employment to enter into any arrangements, agreements, 
or coiooinations with the view of lessening the hours of labor 
or of increasing their wages or bettering their condition; and 
no re:~training order or injunction shall be granted by any 
court of the commonwealth or by any judge thereof in any case 
betwec3n an employer and employee, or between employers and em-
ployees, or between persons employed and persons seeking em-
ployment, or involving or growing out of a dispute concerning 
terms or conditions of employment, or any act or acts done in 
pursu.mce thereof, unless such order or injunction be necessary 
to prevent irreparable injury to property or to a property 
right of the party making the application, for which there is 
no adequate remedy at law; and such property or property right j 
I 
shall be particularly described in the application, which shal 
be sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney. 
xvi 
SECTION 2. In construing this act, the right to enter into 
the relation of employer and employee, to change that relation 
and tc, assume and create a new relation f'or employer and em-
ployee, and to perform and carry on business in such relation 
with s.ny person in any place, or to do work and labor as an 
employee, shall be held and construed to be a personal and 
not a property right. In all cases involving the violation of' 
the contract of employment either by the employee or employer, 
where no irreparable damage is about to be committed upon the 
property or property right of' either, no injunction shall be 
granted but the parties shall be lef't to their remedy at law. 
SECTION 3. No persons who are employed or seeking employ1nent 
or other labor shall be indicted, prosecuted or tried in any 
court of' th~ commonwealth for entering into any arrangement, 
agreement, or combination between themselves as such employees 
or laborers, made with a view of lessening the number of' hours 
of lab:>r or increasing their wages or bettering their conditior:, 
or f'or any act done in pursuance thereof, unless such act is ir. 
I 
itself unlawful. I 
Approved, July 7, 1914 
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CHAPTER 452 
AN ACT HELATIVE TO PEACEFUL PERSUASION AND INJill~CTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES. 
Be it enacted, etc., as follows: 
SEGTION 1. Section 20C of chapter 149 of the General Laws, inserted 
by section 1 of chapter 407 of the acts of 1935, is hereby amended by strik 
ing out the first four lines and inserting in place thereof the follovdng:-
For the purposes of this and the preceding section, section twenty-four of 
chapter one hundred and forty-nine, sections one, nine and nine A of chapte . 
two hundred and fourteen, and sections thirteen A and thirteen B of chapt~r 
two hunired and twenty,--
SEGriON 2. Said section 20C of said chapter 149, as so inserted, is 
I 
hereby amended by striking out subsection (c) and inserting in place thereo ' 
the four follovdng subsections:-- I 
(c) The term 11 labor dispute", when used in sections hereinbefore re-
ferred to, includes any controversy arising out of any demand of any char-
acter whatsoever concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concernin 
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing, or seeking to arrange, terms or conditions of employment . 
regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employe 1 
and employee. 
(d) Except as provided in subsecnion (e) of this section, the term 
11 lawful labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning--
(l) The association or representation of persons in negotiating, 
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange, terms or conditions 
xvii i 
I 
II 
of employment; 
(2) The recognition or bargaining status of a labor organization; 
(3) Rates of pay, wages, hire or tenure or hours of employment, or 
working conditions; 
(4) The execution or performance of an agreement to arbitrate an exist-
ing or ft .ture labor dispute; 
(5) The execution or performance of a collective bargaining agreement 
containing any lawful provision of a kind commonly found in collective bar-
gaining agreements (including but not limited to any provision requiring as 
a condition of employment membership in a labor organization which is the 
exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate collective bar-
gaining unit covered by such agreement when made; or 
(6) Any term or condition of employment which has heretofore been re-
garded an a lawful objective of concerted activities on the part of employees 
or labor organization. 
The foregoing definition shall be applicable regardless of whether the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee, but 
shall not be deemed to include any "unlawful labor dispute" or "unlawful 
secondary boycott" as defined in the following subsections:--
(e) The term "unlawful labor dispute" includes any controversy arising 
out of a demand--
(1) That an employer commit a criminal offence or unfair employment 
practice in violation of chapter one hundred and fifty-one B or unfair labor 
practice either in violation of chapter one hundred and fifty A, or in vio-
l ation OJ:' the National Labor Relations Act; 
(2) That an employer include in a collective bargaining agreement any 
:xix 
I provision the execution or performance of which would be unlavlful; 
I 
I 
(3) I That an employer reco~nize o~ bargain coll~ctively with any labor 
organization as the representat1ve of 1ts employees 1n any bargaining unit 
I I 
1 vmile anbther labor organization is the representative of such employees 
I 
certified by the labor relations commission established by section nine 0 
I 
of chaptl r twenty-three, or by the National Labor Relations Board, prior to 
i 
the time ! said comnussion, or board, would conduct a new investigation and 
I 
certific~tion of representatives. 
I (4) ! That an employer recognize or bargain collectivel y with any labor 
I 
I 
organization as the representative of its employees in any bargaining unit 
I 
within ohe year after the l abor relations commission established by section 
I 
nine 0 o~· chapter twenty-three has determined in a proceeding under section 
five of !chapter one hundred and fifty A that such employees do not desire to 
I 
be repre1~ :ented by such labor organization; or 
I 
I 
i (.5) I~~de by any party to a jurisdictional dispute as defi ned in section 
nine B oif chapter two hundred and fourteen who has failed to abide by any 
I 
I 
I 
voluntar.y arbitration procedure applicable to such dispute or to comply ·with 
I 
the terrd~; of the arbitration award. 
i 
(f)l The term "unlawful secondary boycott" means any strike, slowdovm, 
I 
I 
boycott, ~ or concerted cessation of work or withholding of patronage or ser-
vices, ru·ising out of a labor dispute, where ari object thereof is to force 
I 
or r equfre any person not otherwise engaged in such labor dispute to cease 
I 
I 
using, s 1elling, handling, transporting, or dealing in the products of any 
I 
I 
other p!joducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with 
I 
any other person; provided, however, that a secondary boycott may lavvfully 
be dire , ted at a person the greater part of whose current business over a 
==========9F======~ 
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I 
represenL ttive period is processing, selling, handling, transporting or other r 
wise deaLing in the goods of an employer primarily interested in a lawful 
I 
labor di+:pute or who, by any agreement, understanding or arrangement with 
i 
such employer, is requiring his o1qn employees to perform work or services 
which wobld be done by the employees of such employer in the absence of a 
I 
I 
labor dikpute. 
I . SECTION 3. Subsectlon (2) of section 9A of chapter 214 of the General 
! 
Laws, as l appearing in section 4 of chapter 407 of the acts of 1935, is hereby 
I . 
amended ty addlng at the end of the first sentence the fol1owing:--provided, 
I 
further, [ that no such temporary restraining order shall be issued except upon 
its also/ being made to appear to the satisfaction of the court (either from 
the testh.mony of witnesses or from written assurances filed by counsel in 
I 
regard t~, his personal conduct), --
(A) That a principal representative or attorney of the employees or 
labor or'f;anizations participating in such dispute was informed of the time 
i 
I 
and placjE: at which the application for a temporary restraining order would 
be prese:nted sufficiently in advance to appear in opposition thereto; or 
I 
(B)[ That the ~omplainant made every reasonable effort to comply with 
i 
paragra:Rh (A) but was unable to do so; provided, however, that notification 
by mail lnlone shall not be deemed compliance with this section without proof 
of receif t. 
Such testimony or written assurances shall set forth in detail the man-
! 
ner in which the complainant complied with paragraph (A) or (B) and shall be 
I 
made part of the record in the case. If the defendants appear in opposition 
to the dpplication for a temporary restraining order they shall be afforded 
an oppo~tunity to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses at such length 
I 
xxi 
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as is reJ Bonable under the circumstances and a like opportunity to i ntroduce 
I 
evidence I:Ln opposition thereto,--so that subsection (2) will read as follows:-
! 
I (2) I Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof 
has been ;?;iven, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all kno-vm person 
against W:lOm relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public official., 
I 
of the city or tovm within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or 
I 
committed charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property; pro-
1 
vided, h~wever, that if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a tem-
porary rlstraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial ~nd 
i 
irreparable injury to the complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a 
I 
I temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, suffi-
1 
I 
cient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a preliminary injunction 
upon a h1aring after notice, and a statement of the grounds justifying the 
I 
I 
issuance! of such order shall be made a matter of record by the court; pro-
vided, f h ·ther, that no such temporary restraining order shall be issued ex-
1 
I 
cept upob its also being made to appear to the satisfaction of the court 
I 
(either ~ ·rom the testimony of witnesses or from written assurances filed by 
colinsel ~-n regard to his personal conduct),--
(A)/ That a principal representative or attorney of the employees or 
labor o~ganizations participating in such dispute was informed of the time 
i 
and placiE! at 1ivhich the application for a temporary restraining order would be 
presentelcl sufficiently in advance to appear in opposition t hereto; or 
I 
(B )J That the complainant made every reasonable effort to comply 11vi th 
I 
I 
paragra:8h (A) but was unable so to do; provided, however, that notification 
'by mail 'alone shall not be deemed compliance with this section without proo.f 
of recei~lt . 
I 
I 
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I Such testimony or vrritten assurances shall set forth in detail the 
I . 
manner irl vmich the complainant complied with paragraph (A) or (B) and shall 
I 
be made ~art of the record in the case. If the defendants appear in opposi-
i 
I 
tion to the application for a temporary restraining order they shall be af-
i 
I 
forded an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant's vdtnesses at such 
length a~ is reasonable under the circumstances and a like opportunity to 
; 
I 
introduce evidence in opposition thereto. Such a temporary restraining 
I 
order sh~ll be effective for no longer thru1 five days and shall become void 
i 
at the e1piration of said five days and shall not be subject to renewal. No 
I 
temporart restraining order or preliminary injunction shall be issued except 
i 
on condition that the complainant shall first file an undertaking with ade-
1 
quate security in an amount to be fixed by the court sufficient in its opin-
1 
ion to r~compense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by 
I 
the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including 
all reasl nable costs (together ivith a reasonable attorney's fee) and expense 
! 
of defen~e against the order or against the granting of any injunctive re-
I 
lief sou~:ht in the sa.'lle proceeding and subsequently denied by the court. 
SEcQ I ON 4. Said chapter 149 is hereby further amended by striking out 
I 
I 
section ~ :4, as amended by chapter 272 of the acts of 1933, and inserting in 
I 
place thb,reof the following section:--Section 24. No person shall be pun-
ished cr~.minally, or held liable or answerable in any action at law or suit 
I 
I 
I 
in equit~·, for persuading or attempting to persuade, by printing or otherwise] 
any othe~ · person to do anything, or to pursue any line of conduct not unlawf . 
I 
or actio~table or in violation of any marital or other legal duty, unless such 
I 
' 
persuasibn or attempt to persuade is accompanied by injury or threat of injur, 
I 
to the pE:,rson, property, business or occupation of the person persuaded or 
I 
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' 
attempted to be persua:ded, or by disorder or other unlawful conduct on the 
I 
I 
l 
part of ~he person persuading or attempting to persuade, or is a part of an 
unlawful ! labor dispute or unlawful secondary boycott, or is a part of an un-
i lawful or actionable conspiracy and not a part of a lawful labor dispute, 
nor for lttending in the course of a lawful labor dispute, at any place where 
I 
I 
I 
such per~on or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtain-
ing or cbrrnnunicating information or of so persuading or attempting to per-
i 
I 
suade. 1 
I 
I 
I SECTION 5. Nothing contained in this act shall be deemed to affect 
I 
the int.etpretation or application of chapter one hundred and fifty A of the 
I 
I 
General Laws. 
I 
I 
I 
SECTION 6. 
I 
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to 
any pers9n, court or circumstances is held unconstitutional or othervrise in-
] 
valid, the remaining provisions of the act and the application of such pro-
visions t o other persons, courts or circumstances shall not be affected 
thereby. ! 
I 
SECTION 7. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions 
of this let are hereby repealed and this act shall be construed liberally in 
I 
aid of its purpose vmich is to limit and curtail the use of injunctions in 
I 
I labor di~putes. 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
! 
! 
Approved May 11, 1950 
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